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PREFACE 
The independence of the judiciary is a major concern that is addressed in the 
United Nations recommendations concerning the rule of law. In practice, this 
has much to do with whether prosecutors and judges are able to carry out their 
duties without improper outside influence. However, to date only very little 
empirical evidence has been gathered on this issue. The study reported here 
contributes to filling this gap in knowledge. 
This report is based on a study carried out in 2008 with support from the 
Scandinavian Research Council for Criminology, the Swedish National Crime 
Prevention Council (Brå), and the European Institute for Crime Prevention and 
Control, affiliated with the United Nations (HEUNI). It brings together the 
Swedish and Finnish country reports, authored by, respectively, researcher 
Johanna Skinnari with the guidance of Mr Lars Korsell, Director of Brå’s Unit 
for research on economic and organised crime, and Senior Researcher Mika 
Junninen and Director Kauko Aromaa of HEUNI. The web survey in both 
countries was organised by Mika Junninen and Kauko Aromaa of HEUNI. 
This report was prepared by Kauko Aromaa, who at the time of the study was 
Director of HEUNI. In addition to bringing the two survey results from 
Sweden and Finland together, and thus providing a comparative perspective on 
improper influence against judges and prosecutors – an issue which is as timely 
as ever – it contributes to the general methodological literature on victim 
surveys by containing (in annex 4) a separate analysis of questions relating to 
cumulation and heterogeneity of risks. 
 
Helsinki 22 February 2016 
 
Kauko Aromaa 
former Director, HEUNI 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The web survey was carried out in 2008, targeting all prosecutors and judges in 
office in Finland and Sweden. The forms of improper influence addressed in 
the questionnaire were harassment, threats, violence, vandalism and corruption. 
The reference period applied was the preceding 18 months. The survey was 
carried out simultaneously in Finland and in Sweden using an identical 
questionnaire.  
Judges and prosecutors have experience of all of the listed forms of improper 
influences. However, the dominant forms of influence are harassment and 
threats. 
Victimisation occurred primarily at the workplace, and only rarely in the 
leisure time of the respondents. 
Most of the perpetrators were individuals who were not connected with 
criminal organisations. This is the case in particular when the victim was a 
judge. Occasionally, however, organised crime representatives were also 
observed to be involved. This was true for prosecutors in particular.  
Swedish prosecutors were harassed and threatened by organised crime 
representatives significantly more often than Finnish prosecutors. 
It was unusual that family members of the civil servants concerned were 
victimised, but also some such instances were reported, some of them quite 
serious. Again, such incidents were more likely in Sweden than in Finland. 
According to the respondents, the employer organisations of the respondents 
had not done very much to prevent such incidents or to protect their employees 
from improper influences. The respondents were also of the opinion that much 
more should be done about the problem. 
The respondents had many suggestions for improvements, some of them quite 
sophisticated. These included, inter alia, ideas concerning the way their work 
was organised, the protection of personal data, access control, and the physical 
design of the offices and courtrooms. Overall, the responses demonstrate that 
the persons involved should be consulted carefully when planning and 
implementing new measures to prevent improper influences and to minimize 
their impact. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The objective and the research problems 
The United Nations have expressed concern that the rule of law may be 
hampered by unlawful action taken against the civil servants in question.
1
 
However, little empirical evidence has been available on the scope and 
contents of possible problems in this area. In order to be able to provide some 
perspective, any assessment of the situation should take a comparative 
approach. 
The objective of the current study is to measure and compare unlawful actions 
that we have chosen to call “improper influences” directed against prosecutors 
and judges in Sweden and Finland. The research questions are: 
•  How prevalent is improper influence? 
•  Are also family members of prosecutors and judges victimised? 
                                                 
1
 This concern is dealt with, for example, in the following United Nations standards and norms: 
- the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (General Assembly resolution 34/169, 
annex); 
- Guidelines for the effective implementation of the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement 
Officials (Economic and Social Council resolution 1989/61, annex); 
- Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (Eighth 
United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, 
27 August-7 September 1990: report prepared  by the Secretariat (United Nations publication, 
Sales No. E.91.IV.2), chap. I. sect. B.2, annex); 
- Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary (Seventh United Nations Congress on 
the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Milan, 26 August-6 September 1985: 
report prepared by the  Secretariat (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.86.IV.1), chap. I, 
sect. D.2, annex); 
- Procedures for the effective implementation of the Basic Principles on the Independence of 
the Judiciary (Economic and Social Council resolution 1989/60, annex); 
- Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers (Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention 
of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, 27 August-7 September 1990: report 
prepared by the Secretariat (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.91.IV.2), chap. I, sect. 
B.3, annex); 
- Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors (Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of 
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, 27 August-7 September 1990: report prepared 
by the Secretariat (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.91.IV.2), chap. I, sect. C.26, 
annex); 
- International Code of Conduct for Public Officials (General Assembly resolution 51/59, 
annex); and  
- the United Nations Declaration against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial 
Transactions (General Assembly resolution 51/ 191, annex) 
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• Who are known / suspected of being involved in the improper 
influence? 
• In what situations and what stages of the legal process is the 
influence exerted? 
• Are incidents of improper influence reported and recorded? 
• What can be done and what is being done in order to prevent 
improper influence? 
Improper influence as a problem 
Improper influence directed at prosecutors and judges may be conceptualised 
in a framework of workplace safety and the working atmosphere, or in a 
framework of the legitimacy and functioning of the criminal justice system, i.e. 
the rule of law. Both frameworks are relevant, and both comprise issues dealt 
with in this study. For both frameworks, the (crime) prevention approach is 
equally relevant. 
From the workplace safety perspective, the issue is violence and other personal 
or workplace-related violations that are related to the victim’s work and occur 
on the job (sometimes, the private and public overlap as for instance when an 
employee is harassed, threatened or assaulted in the workplace for private 
motives). However, according to both Finnish and Swedish law, the employer 
has a general obligation to provide protection against risks in the work 
environment, whether they have work-related or other causes. 
From the perspective of legitimacy, or the rule of law, the core issue is the 
credibility and efficiency of the authorities responsible for law enforcement. 
Improper influences may jeopardise and endanger the rule of law, or the 
objectivity, reliability and independence of these authorities. Such influences 
are not acceptable in a system based on the rule of law, even if the employees 
involved would not be at risk regarding their personal safety or the safety of 
their family. It is in the public interest to prevent such influences and to 
minimise their impact if they occur. 
From the prevention perspective, each case may require different measures. 
Social prevention as well as situational prevention measures deserve to be 
considered. In general terms, situational prevention may be seen as a matter of 
four main aspects (Clarke & Eck 2003; Cornish & Clarke 2003): increasing the 
risks; reducing the benefits (in this case, the success of the influence attempt); 
reducing the incentives, and removing the pretexts). In practice, these may be 
translated into multiple measures at multiple levels, such as identity protection, 
being prepared, developing coping skills, introducing general rules, training, 
integrity, physical planning, social planning, administrative planning, access 
control, monitoring and other technical prevention. 
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Forms of improper influence 
Improper influence can be either instrumental or expressive, or both. Much of 
the improper influence may be expected to be of an instrumental nature, with 
the objective of obtaining a favourable decision or of disturbing or delaying the 
legal procedure. There is an obvious interest for suspects, defendants, plaintiffs 
and other stakeholders to try to interfere with the decision-making in each 
phase of the legal procedure, in particular if there is the belief, hope or chance 
that such influence might be successful. Whether instrumental or expressive, 
the influence may sometimes be of a very serious character. 
Improper influences may also be exerted in retaliation, or they may simply be 
uncontrolled expressions of frustration. However, even such cases may 
simultaneously have an instrumental aspect, demonstrating to the 
representatives of the criminal justice system that they may be at risk if they do 
certain things, i.e. the influence may have a “general preventive” or “general 
deterrent” purpose. Such a consequence may also be unintended. Such cases 
often occur after the decision in the case has been taken, but they may also 
happen before the decision, the message then being that it is not advisable to 
interfere with certain kinds of affairs. 
If the influence occurs before the decision, it is more obvious that instrumental 
motives may be at the forefront, in particular with the motive of trying to 
discontinue, slow down or distract the procedure. However, also in this case, 
the objective may be to convey the message that the authorities should not 
interfere with the actors exerting the influence. 
If the influence is just a reaction to a decision, we are dealing with a different 
issue than if the purpose is to influence the decision. For the criminal justice 
system employees involved, and their personal, physical or social safety, the 
purpose of the action may not always make much difference. The two issues 
are, however, fundamentally different: the retaliation or the reactive protest 
may need to be dealt with differently than is the case with an attempt to 
influence future decisions. Also as a problem of control and prevention, the 
two cases may have different implications that deserve further analysis. 
In respect of the forms that influence may take, surveys have applied different 
operational definitions. For example, the 1999 Finnish-Lithuanian survey 
(Aromaa 2002) assessed improper influence as comprising threats, violence, 
extortion, and bribery directed at the respondent or his/her family. The 2005 
Swedish survey (Brå 2005) addressed also additional phenomena: harassment 
and damage to property.  
The current Finnish-Swedish 2008 survey adopted the categories applied in the 
Swedish 2005 survey. Thus, compared with the 1999 Finnish-Lithuanian 
survey, harassment and damage to property were added, and extortion (which 
according to the previous survey was very rare) was not included. 
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Also other forms of improper influence have been identified, which are not 
always easy to classify under any of the above categories. Such forms may be 
of many subtle kinds, including delicate pressure through sexual services or 
attraction, vague promises or hints that resemble “offers you cannot refuse”, 
“old boys’ network” services to help out a friend, or symbolic acts that only the 
target knows how to interpret. Also letter-bombs and letters containing toxic 
powder or other dangerous or unpleasant substances have been observed.
2
 All 
of these forms of behaviour are apparently quite uncommon but examples of 
them have been described in earlier research and in other sources. 
Earlier studies 
Before the present study, similar research had been carried out in both 
countries. In Finland, a first survey was made in 2000 using the mail 
questionnaire mode.
3
 In Sweden, a similar study was published in 2005 (Brå 
2005). The studies were not identical and thus not strictly comparable. 
However, on a general level the overall findings were not dissimilar. 
In the present study, an attempt was to be particularly comparative. The model 
was taken from the 2005 Swedish study, modified, inter alia, according to 
experiences from the 2000 Finnish study. In particular for budgetary reasons 
but also for the sake of comparability,
4
 the web survey mode was applied in 
both cases. Identical questionnaires were drafted, testing for meanings by 
consultations with experts knowledgeable in the work of prosecutors and 
judges. The electronic questionnaires were sent to the respondents using a web 
survey program (Webropol), administered by HEUNI for both countries. 
                                                 
2 
An example was reported from the Office of the Finnish Prosecutor General: “[on 6 October 
2010] the office of the Prosecutor General received a letter that contained powder… The 
person who opened the letter suffered mild skin symptoms although he was wearing gloves… 
The same individual had been sending similar mail to the Office of the Prosecutor General also 
before. The earlier letters, however, had not contained dangerous substances. They have 
instead been primarily harassment and clumsy attempts at extortion”. (Helsingin Sanomat, 8 
October 2010, p. A11). 
3
 Furthermore, a survey of experiences with improper influence in connection with police work 
was carried out in Finland in 2005, with financial support from the Scandinavian Research 
Council for Criminology (NSfK) (Junninen 2005). 
4
 There is not yet very much experience regarding the significance of different survey modes 
regarding comparability. However, some studies do indicate that also internet surveys can be 
used and that the results are similar to those of other modes, and thus acceptable. This needs to 
be subjected to further systematic testing, and since this methodological issue was not the topic 
of the current study, both surveys applied an identical survey mode. The response rate of web 
surveys has been found usually to be lower than in surveys applying other more traditional data 
collection modes (Lozar-Manfreda & Vehovar 2004; Groves et al. 2009). 
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SAMPLE, RESPONSE RATE, METHODOLOGICAL 
ISSUES 
Below, we describe the samples and the way the survey was carried out. We 
also discuss some advantages and disadvantages of the method. 
The Swedish sample 
The Swedish target group comprised all prosecutors employed in the 
Prosecution Authority (Åklagarmyndigheten; ÅM) and in the Economic Crime 
Authority (Ekobrottsmyndigheten; EBM), as well as all regular and non-
permanent judges (fiskaler and assessorer) in general courts of first instance 
and in the (administrative) province courts (länsrätt). 
The Swedish group of prosecutors comprises the same categories that were 
targeted in the previous Brå survey (2005). However, the group of judges is not 
quite identical with the one addressed in the 2005 study. In the present survey, 
the target group was broadened so that it also comprises administrative courts 
as well as a larger group of non-permanent judges in general courts (the 2005 
study only comprised those non-permanent judges who were dealing with 
criminal matters). The reason for this was that attempts at influencing the work 
of judges are by no means limited to criminal trials; on the contrary, earlier 
research would indicate that this is more common in family law cases or other 
cases where the case generates strong emotions among the parties involved. 
Such parties do not consider themselves as criminals/offenders, and therefore 
may feel that they do not belong in court (Geiger 2001). Rather than drawing a 
sample of all judges, the study was restricted to comprise only courts of first 
instance, whether general courts or administrative courts. 
The Finnish sample 
The Finnish sample was identical to the Swedish one, with the exception that 
also other courts (Appeal Courts, the Supreme Court and the Supreme 
Administrative Court, the Insurance Court, the Labour Court and the Market 
Court) were included (see Junninen & Aromaa 2010). In this report, we focus 
only on the comparable part of the Finnish data, and therefore only judges in 
first instance general courts and administrative courts are included. In Finland, 
there is no separate prosecutorial unit for economic crime. Therefore, the 
following analysis collapses the prosecutors of the Swedish Prosecution 
Authority and those of the Swedish Economic Crime Authority. 
The number of persons who received the link to the web survey is shown in 
Table 1. 
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Table 1. Number of persons in the sample 
Category Sweden Finland
All prosecutors of the Prosecution Authority* 762 344
All prosecutors of the Economic Crime Authority* 95 .
All judges of general courts of first instance 598 471
All judges of administrative courts of first instance** 274 317
Total 1729 1132
* In Finland, all prosecutors are organised under one authority 
** In the Finnish data, referendaries of administrative courts are included. 
(Referendaries prepare cases for decision by the judges, and have special legal 
responsibility in doing so) 
Fieldwork 
In Sweden, on 26 March 2008, an e-mail was sent to all persons in the sample, 
providing them with a link to the survey. Before this, and once more when the 
link was sent, information about the survey was provided on the intranet 
systems of the Prosecution Authority (Åklagarmyndigheten), the Court 
Authority (Domstolsverket) and the Economic Crime Authority 
(Ekobrottsmyndigheten). A reminder was sent by e-mail on 10 April, with 
further reminders during May and June over telephone to chief prosecutors and 
deputy chief prosecutors of the Prosecution Authority and the Economic Crime 
Authority, as well as to leading judges (rådmän) in the Court Authority. All of 
these measures were taken in order to increase the response rate (cf. Frankfort-
Nachmias and Nachmias 1996; Denscombe 1998). 
In Finland, no register of all prosecutors and judges was available. Therefore, 
the link to the questionnaire was e-mailed to the office e-mail address of all 
courts and prosecutor’s offices, requesting the link to be forwarded to all 
relevant employees. This was done on 26 March 2008. Reminders were sent on 
10 April and 21 April. The Finnish part of the survey was closed on 21 May 
2008. 
Response rate 
In the Swedish survey, 1096 persons out of 1729 responded, or 63 per cent of 
the entire research population. In the comparative part of the Finnish survey, 
673 persons out of 1132 responded, or 59.5 per cent of the entire research 
population.
5
 Table 2 shows the response rate in different respondent categories. 
                                                 
5
 Of the Finnish data, this report only deals with the prosecutors and judges who are 
organisationally equivalent to those of the Swedish study. The full Finnish data are presented 
in the Finnish country report (Junninen & Aromaa 2010). 
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The Swedish response rate was lower than the one in the Swedish survey on 
improper influences in 2005. The response rate in Finland was moderately 
lower than the one in the current Swedish survey, but considerably lower than 
in the Finnish 1999 survey. 
The low response rates in both countries are, however, not unexpected since 
web surveys have often been observed to yield lower response rates than mail 
surveys, which were applied in the previous Finnish and Swedish studies 
(Aromaa 2006; Dahmström 2005; Trost and Hultåker 2008). 
The non-response turned out to be of considerable interest in the Finnish 2000 
study. It was found that many prosecutors and judges in two large cities 
(Helsinki and Turku) did not reply, and subsequent controls revealed that these 
non-respondents had often had problems related to improper influences. 
Therefore, the conclusion was that some of the non-response may be indicative 
of an influence problem, while some of it could signal that the respondent did 
not have such experiences. It is possible that these two alternatives balance 
each other out. If this is the case, then the non-response did not cause under-
reporting of the problem experiences. It would be important to look at the 
reasons for the non-response more closely. In the current study, this was not 
possible because of anonymity pledges that prevented the identification of non-
respondents and follow-ups, where these could have been approached once 
more. 
Table 2. Response rate, Sweden and Finland 
  Sweden   Finland   
Respondent category Number Per cent Number Per cent 
Prosecutors, the Prosecution Authority 
450 59.1 . . 
(Åklagarmyndigheten) 
Prosecutors, the Economic Crime 
Authority (Ekobrottsmyndigheten) 
78 82.1 . . 
Prosecutors, total 528 62.5 255 74.1 
Judges, general courts of first instance 387 64.7 264 56.1 
Judges, administrative courts 178 65.0 154 48.7 
Total
6
 1096 63.4 673 59.5 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Three persons who completed the questionnaire did not answer the introductory questions 
about where they were employed. 
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Methodological problems 
In Sweden, some prosecutors and judges informed the research team that the 
survey does not work very well, or that they had problems in responding to 
web surveys because of insufficient computer skills. There were also other 
problems that may come up with the web survey method (Dahmström 2005; 
Trost and Hultåker, 2008; cf. also Denscombe 1998). Such issues may have 
contributed to the low response rate. 
Also in the Finnish survey, similar feedback was received. However, the 
overall reaction was positive. Since the response rate was, nonetheless, lower 
than in the 2000 survey, and the reported problems were clearly dissimilar to 
the 2000 findings, we do suspect that the lower response rate in Finland may 
have concealed some rather serious cases of improper influence. 
In terms of identifying more detail, in any collection of data the paper 
questionnaire mode is inferior to a face-to-face or telephone interview. For 
resource reasons, personal interviews were not an option in the current study. 
HEUNI, which administered the survey, decided furthermore to make several 
of the follow-up questions voluntary, and this has likely caused some degree of 
unit non-response (i.e. sometimes such individual questions were not answered 
even if the respondent answered other questions). Results for questions for 
which the unit non-response was assessed to be too large are not discussed in 
this report. 
THE PROFESSIONAL ROLES 
The roles of prosecutors and judges 
Prosecutors and judges have central roles in the court/criminal justice 
procedure. The police, of course, are first in line when the criminal justice 
procedure is concerned, and their situation needs to be researched. Similarly, it 
would be relevant to know what kinds of pressures and other improper 
influences are exerted on lay judges, witnesses and attorneys. A further point of 
interest would be to investigate in what ways and to what extent the media are 
trying to exert influence on the work of the courts. For budgetary reasons, the 
focus in the current study is on prosecutors and judges only. 
In criminal cases, the chain of legal decisions starts from the criminal 
investigation carried out by the police. At this stage, the interest in influencing 
the decisions may be expected to be relatively high since, if successful, all 
future harm to the suspect and others involved would be prevented. Also the 
volume of potential trouble-makers is obviously larger than at the next stages 
of the chain of legal decisions, and it is therefore likely that also the prevalence 
of experiences of improper influence is highest at this initial stage of the 
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procedure. As we have not included the police in this study, this idea could not 
be pursued further; however, a previous study (Junninen 2005) indicated that it 
is likely to be supported by empirical evidence. 
The next authority in the chain are the prosecutors. It is up to them to decide 
whether charges are pressed or not. The volume of suspects and potential 
trouble-makers is smaller than at the police stage, but also the decision to 
prosecute or not has heavier consequences. For this reason, it is difficult to 
speculate whether the individual risk of experiences of influence would be 
higher or lower than at the police stage, also because there is a relatively 
speaking larger proportion of rather trivial cases at the police stage. Thus, when 
a case reaches the prosecutor, some of the more trivial cases have been pruned 
out, and the average interest of the person concerned to influence the next 
decision may be larger. 
The final authority in the chain are the general court judges. In criminal 
procedure, their role is to sit back and assess the evidence as well as apply the 
law. Although the interest in influencing this decision could again deemed to 
be greater than at the previous stage when prosecution is decided upon, judges 
are both physically and psychologically at a distance from the event and its 
investigation, to the effect that experiences with problems could be expected to 
be a bit less prevalent among them. General court judges, however, also deal 
with civil law cases, often comprising in practice divorce and child custody 
conflicts, in which the risks of problems may be quite different than in criminal 
cases. 
Administrative court judges are at the end of a quite different chain of 
administrative decisions. In Finland and Sweden, their cases are prepared and 
initially decided upon in municipal administration, the decisions being taken by 
a variety of municipal authorities. The case may, for example, be about 
taxation, planning and construction, child protection, coercive mental health 
measures, administrative deprivation of liberty, or residence permits or 
deportation. In such matters, the stakes may at times be high, and emotions 
may become heated. As the decisions are mostly taken in written proceedings 
in which the parties are not present in person, it might be expected that the 
overall prevalence of improper influence could be lower than in the general 
courts. 
In order to understand why some actors have an interest in influencing judges 
and prosecutors, we need to look at how prosecutors and judges of general 
courts of first instance/administrative courts work. With more knowledge about 
the professional roles, the survey results become more transparent. 
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The prosecutor – a visible individual who presses 
charges 
In earlier research, the prosecutor has been singled out as the professional 
category within the criminal justice system who is particularly often subjected 
to improper influences (Brå 2005:18; cf. also Åklagarväsendet rapport 1995:7). 
Prosecutors reported mainly having been subjected to serious disturbances (11 
per cent) and serious threats (7 per cent), and to a significantly lower degree to 
violence and illegal offers (Brå 2005:18; cf. also Åklagarväsendet rapport 
1995:7; Harris et al. 2001; RKP rapport 1994:2; RKP KUT-rapport 2004:9b). 
A number of other studies, including the previous Brå and HEUNI surveys, 
indicate that attempts to corrupt prosecutors (and judges) are very rare in 
Finland and Sweden (RKP KUT-rapport 2004:9b; Nordqvist 2003; 
Mischkowitz 2000; Junninen 2007). The corruption that seems to take place is 
friendship-based corruption or bribes in the form of cash or different kinds of 
gifts (Nordqvist 2003; Mischkowitz 2000; Brå 2007:21). 
An explanation for the relatively high rates of harassment and threats is that 
prosecutors as individuals are rather visible because of their leading role in the 
crime investigation and their powers to decide whether charges are pressed and 
what the charges are about. The prosecutor, despite his/her role as a 
representative of the law enforcement bureaucracy, appears often to be seen as 
a person who is acting on his/her own initiative. According to both Swedish 
and Finnish criminal procedural law, it is also the prosecutor whose obligation 
it is to be the active party.  
The media are also increasingly often describing the prosecutor as an 
individual. A Swedish prosecutor described the situation in the web survey: 
“Related to a TV programme about a case I had prosecuted and in which 
my role had been described in an unfair manner as weak, I immediately 
received a number of unpleasant telephone calls. Persons I did not know 
called and gave me shit in a way that was rather disquieting. It is 
impossible just to shake it off, there is always something unpleasant that 
remains”.7  
A Finnish prosecutor referred to a corruption case, in which 
“the local media made strong statements indicating that the prosecutor is 
shooting a fly with a cannon. To be subjected to such media criticism may 
be subsequently reflected in future prosecution decisions, at least 
subconsciously.”8 
                                                 
7
 That people receive negative feedback after media publicity is, however, something else: in 
this case, it happened to be a prosecutor, but it was perhaps not just the lawsuit but his 
exposure to media publicity itself that gave rise to the negative reactions. 
8
 This case illustrates a different but equally relevant consequence of media publicity. 
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It is the prosecutor as an individual who expresses himself or herself, who 
explains, who has opinions and who takes action. The prosecutor is a party in 
the case, and even if he/she is also to take into account the circumstances that 
are in favour of the defendant, he/she is still likely to be seen as an “opponent”. 
Furthermore, the prosecutor is often involved at an early stage of the criminal 
procedure and is taking decisions that are mostly negative for the defendant 
concerned. The prosecutor as an individual is simply a much exposed person, 
and this also makes the prosecutor an obvious target of improper influence. 
Many prosecutors commented on this issue in the web survey. Below, we cite a 
Swedish comment: 
“You must understand that it is the prosecutor as the head of the crime 
investigation and as the one who makes the decisions who is eventually 
responsible for more serious investigations. Criminal organisations and 
individual offenders identify by name the prosecutors who are responsible 
for them being prosecuted. The prosecutor should not appear by name but 
only as a representative of the Prosecution Authority.” 
A Finnish prosecutor described an incident where his person was connected 
with the attack: 
“After the court verdict, the female partner of a man sentenced to 
imprisonment for an aggravated assault came to my office and slapped my 
face because she said it was my fault as the prosecutor that her husband 
was convicted.” 
Another Finnish prosecutor said: 
“A very central issue with regard to preventing influence attempts is how 
to protect the personal data of civil servants more effectively than what is 
currently the case. From what I know, the personal data protection order 
given by the administrative court is very inefficient. People who wish to 
harass and threaten find out the home addresses and other personal data 
regardless of the personal data protection order. This matter needs to be 
improved.” 
There are also differences between prosecutors as to what kinds of cases they 
are pursuing. Crime investigations that give rise to a lot of emotion and receive 
much media exposure are likely to create a higher degree of threat compared to 
cases with no publicity. Similarly, it is likely that the material interests as well 
as the severity of the sanction involved play a role – if large interests are at 
stake, the risk of improper influence attempts is probably larger than in small 
cases. Also, for instance in economic crime cases, the suspects are on average 
more powerful and resourceful than in other cases, and may perhaps 
consequently be more able and likely to resort also to extra-legal measures. 
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The judge in general courts of first instance – a 
neutral person towards the end of the criminal justice 
process 
The previous Swedish study on improper influence comprised all regular 
judges in general courts, but regarding criminal cases, only non-permanent 
judges. In this latter group, the victimisation by improper influence displayed a 
pattern that was similar to the one found among the Swedish prosecutors, but 
on a lower level: harassment, 8 per cent; threats, 3 per cent; and violence, less 
than one per cent of the judges (Brå 2005:18). Also offers of an unacceptable 
nature (bribery) were rare, in particular compared with other professional 
groups. In the Finnish study of the year 2000, a similar pattern was found. 
However, the results cannot be directly compared, since the 2000 study did not 
comprise harassment. 
A reasonable explanation for this finding – the difference in comparison to 
prosecutors – is that judges appear at a rather late stage of the criminal justice 
process, where the crime investigation has been completed, and where a 
prosecutor has already made the decision to prosecute. The chances of 
influencing the outcome may therefore be assessed to be relatively small. It is 
also reasonable to assume that the more time that has passed – with 
interrogations and other police and prosecutorial measures – the less 
emotionally “charged” is each subsequent encounter with the criminal justice 
system. This idea is derived from the observation that much of the improper 
influence detected seems to be rather irrational, and the objective of really 
influencing the decision of the representative of the relevant authority or of 
intimidating others in regards to their future decisions is thus not a leading one.  
Furthermore, the judge as an individual is usually not similarly singled out and 
regarded as active as the prosecutor, but is rather considered to be a neutral and 
more passive party in the Swedish and the Finnish law enforcement continuum. 
It is also less common that a judge would be clearly visible in the media – 
judges rather seem to communicate through their sentences. 
Nevertheless, also judges may suffer from publicity. A Finnish judge explains: 
“My address is protected, and my telephone number is secret. Also, there 
is no mail box with my name on it in front of my house. All staff members 
should keep secret the judge’s contact information, telephone numbers and 
physical location – the correct answer to anyone asking for this is that 
he/she will be contacted if there is a reason to do so. For instance, a real 
bomber does not call because he wants to speak with the civil servant but 
because he wants to find out where the civil servant is in order to detonate 
his bomb at the right time and place… Members of the court should not be 
photographed by the media.”  
Discussions related to improper influence against judges in general courts of 
first instance mostly make reference to criminal cases. It is easy to believe that 
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“criminals” are particularly inclined to attempt direct improper influence of 
judges. Earlier research indicated, however, that both prosecutors and judges 
had observed that those attempting to influence them were, alongside 
individual offenders, often querulants (persons who obsessively feel wronged 
and go to court for the sake of principle), mentally disturbed persons, persons 
in a desperate situation, and substance abusers (Brå 2005:18). This means that 
there is a substantially larger variety of actors other than just “offenders” whom 
the judges are confronting and who may be active in seeking to exert improper 
influence. 
Furthermore, such influencers are often observed other than in criminal cases. 
Regarding general courts of first instance, it is therefore civil cases, in 
particular family cases that represent a high-risk area (cf. Geiger 2001). In the 
Finnish 2008 data, child custody conflicts were found to be a case in point: 
desperate parents may not refrain from even the most extreme moves if other 
methods prove to be unsuccessful. The results of the previous Swedish study 
also gave indications that judges of administrative courts may be subjected to 
improper influence. They are often dealing with issues in which large material 
interests are concerned, and therefore the parties involved may have a high 
motivation to rely even to last resorts such as attempts at improper influence. 
The judge of the province court (Sweden) / the judge 
of the administrative court (Finland)
9
 – the relevance 
of written proceedings 
In distinction from judges in general courts, judges in the administrative courts 
have not previously been studied with regard to improper influence. 
A central difference between the two Swedish and Finnish categories of judges 
is that administrative court judges mostly do not conduct oral hearings in the 
main portion of proceedings. Their cases are instead about conflicts between 
individual persons and the state, and often have to do with tax issues, foreigner 
and nationality issues, social insurance issues, and other issues such as driving 
licences or alcohol sales licences (www.dom.se). The matters coming before 
the administrative courts are mostly dealt with in writing, not in personal face-
to-face encounters. A Finnish judge comments: 
“Since the administrative court procedure is mainly based on documents, 
the parties involved sometimes call on the telephone or visit the office in 
order to ask about the situation and the scheduling of the case. In this 
context, they often try to explain their ideas regarding the case.” 
                                                 
9
 Below, the terms “administrative courts” and “administrative court judges” shall be used for 
both the Swedish and the Finnish courts. 
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VICTIMISATION THROUGH IMPROPER 
INFLUENCE 
Table 3 depicts the victimisation rates regarding the five most common forms 
of improper influence
10
 among prosecutors, and among judges in general 
courts and administrative courts in both countries. The last column shows the 
prevalence of family members having been victimised by any of these forms of 
influence. 
Harassment and threats are sometimes difficult to distinguish since they 
contain similar elements, and consequently, some respondents may have 
interpreted an event as harassment while some others might interpret a similar 
event as a threat.
11
  
Harassment and threats are experienced relatively often, while violence, 
bribery attempts, vandalism, and attempts at influence targeting family 
members are quite rare. The prevalence of harassment victimisation ranged 
from 10 to 22 per cent, while threats had been experienced by 3-9 per cent. The 
highest harassment victimisation rates were found among the prosecutors, at 
the level of 21-22 per cent in both countries. Also for threats, the highest 
prevalence rates, about 8-9 per cent, were found among the prosecutors in both 
countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 Definitions of each were provided in the questionnaire (Annex 6). 
11
 In the end, harassment and threat are subjectively defined. What is harassment to one 
respondent may be experienced as threat by another. Also, there is always a grey area around 
the edges of such concepts, as is illustrated by the comment of a Finnish prosecutor:  
“To my mind, the attempts at improper influence occur mostly unintentionally when 
parties in court cases communicate with us. They are often inclined to express their ideas 
regarding the reliability of the court system in general. Mostly, they criticise the neutrality 
of civil servants in general, and are already in advance critical of the forthcoming decision 
of the prosecutor…” 
This kind of influence is at least very close to an attempt at improper influence but does maybe 
not quite meet the definition of “harassment” used in this study. The issue is mostly one of 
parties who can be described as being “difficult clients”. 
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Table 3. Victimisation prevalence, preceding 18 months, Finland and Sweden, 
%. 
Finland Harassment Threats Violence Vandalism Corruption
Family 
members 
victimised
Prosecutors 22.4 9.0 0.8 0.4 0.4 2.0
General court judges 16.7 4.9 0.8 0.4 0.4 1.9
Administrative courts 11.0 3.2 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
Sweden Harassment Threats Violence Vandalism Corruption
Family 
members 
victimised
Prosecutors 21.4 8.0 0.6 1.7 0.8 1.9
General court judges 10.3 3.1 0.5 0.8 0.3 0.5
Administrative courts 10.7 7.9 1.1 0.6 1.1 1.1
 
REPEAT VICTIMISATION 
Repeat victimisation is an important topic that should be studied further. The 
working conditions of victims of multiple incidents may need to be improved, 
or perhaps their tasks and duties should be reconsidered. The risk mechanisms 
of such victims may also prove to be different from those of persons who 
become victims only rarely or on a single occasion. To study such mechanisms 
may shed new light on how prevention could be improved. 
Harassment 
Table 4 reproduces the distributions of incidents of harassment as reported by 
each respondent category. The distributions have been cut at five incidents; 
earlier victimisation surveys have shown that it is difficult to provide accurate 
figures for very frequent events, and high incidence figures are thus not very 
reliable in a statistical sense. 
In both countries, it was common to report only one incident of harassment (34 
% of all Swedish victims, 38 % of all Finnish victims). 
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Table 4. Harassment: reported incidents during the preceding 18 months, 
Finland and Sweden 
Finland 1 2 3 4 5+
Total 
victims
N 45 43 13 5 13 119
% 38 36 11 4 11 100
N 18 23 6 4 7 58
% 31 40 10 7 12 100
N 13 18 7 - 6 44
% 30 41 16 - 14 100
N 14 2 - 1 - 17
% 82 12 - 6 - 100
Sweden
N 59 40 24 11 38 172
% 34 23 14 6 22 100
N 35 29 17 9 23 113
% 31 26 15 8 20 100
N 18 7 3 2 10 40
% 45 18 8 5 25 100
N 6 4 4 - 5 19
% 32 21 21 - 26 100
Total (674)
Prosecutors (255)
General court judges 
(264)
General court judges 
(387)
Administrative courts 
(178)
Administrative
Total (1093)
Prosecutors (528)
 
Of those victimised, over two-thirds (71 %) in Sweden and over four-fifths (85 
%) in Finland had experienced three incidents or fewer. There are, however, a 
small number of persons who had been victims of a very large number of 
incidents of harassment, ranging from about ten incidents up to an estimated 40 
incidents (Sweden), or up to 99 incidents (Finland). One out of five (22 %) 
Swedish victims and one out of ten (11 %) Finnish victims had experienced 
five incidents or more. 
These findings indicate that victimisation is a strongly cumulative and/or 
heterogeneous phenomenon (cf. Aromaa 1971; Hope & Trickett 2004). At the 
end of this report, a separate chapter (Aromaa 2011) presents an analysis of the 
distributions of victimisation incidents in both countries. 
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Threats 
Table 5 shows the distributions of incidents of threats in each respondent 
category. Most victims reported only once incident, but some come up to five 
or more. 
Table 5. Threats – reported incidents during the preceding 18 months, Finland 
and Sweden 
Finland 1 2 3 4  5+
Total 
victims
N 25 13 1 2 1 42
% 69 31 2 5 2 100
N 14 8  - 2   - 24
% 58 33  - 8   - 100
N 7 4 1  - 1 13
% 54 31 8  - 8 100
N 4 1   -  -  - 5
% 80 20   -  -  - 100
Sweden
N 37 18 7 1 4 67
% 55 27 10 1 6 100
N 21 13 4 1 3 42
% 50 31 10 2 7 100
N 8 2 1  - 1 12
% 67 17 8  - 8 100
N 8 3 2 - - 13
% 62 23 15 - - 100
Prosecutors (528)
General court judges 
(387)
Administrative court 
judges (178)
Total (1093)
Total (673)
Prosecutors (255)
General court judges 
(264) 
Administrative court 
judges (154) 
 
Threats were overall less prevalent than incidents of harassment, and this is 
also reflected in the distributions of incidents shown in Table 5. 
Most Swedish judges who reported having been threatened, said that there had 
been one (53 %) or two (25 %) incidents. However, some reported as many as 
five incidents. The same pattern was found in all three Swedish respondent 
groups. In the Finnish responses, correspondingly, seven victims out of ten had 
been threatened only once, and the differences between the respondent groups 
were not very large. 
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The incidence of other problems 
Since only a few judges and prosecutors reported having been victims of 
damage to property, violence or corruption attempts, the three groups are 
difficult to compare in detail. It is, however, striking that such incidents are not 
only rare in terms of how many persons have been victimised but also in terms 
of how many incidents had been experienced by individual victims. As many 
as 11 out of the 13 persons who said that they had been victims of damage to 
property reported only one single incident. The same is true of incidents of 
violence - it was most common that one single violent incident was reported, 
even if some replies reported as many as three. Finally, five persons of those 
seven who had received offers of bribes had only received one such offer 
during the reference period of 18 months. 
In the Finnish data, no multiple victimisation was found for violence, damage 
to property or bribery attempts. 
Family members are victimised only rarely 
In both countries, slightly over one per cent (Sweden: 1.2 %, Finland: 1.5 %) of 
the respondents said that family members had been victimised, mostly by 
harassment. 
Table 6. Percentage of respondents who reported that their family members 
were victims of improper influence with the purpose of influencing the 
respondent’s functions as a civil servant. 
Sweden Finland
Number Number
Harassment 7 0.6 9 1.3
Threats 5 0.5 1 0.1
Vandalism 2 0.2 - -
Violence - - - -
Corruption - - - -
Per cent 
(n=1097)
Per cent 
(n=673)
 
For Sweden, most of the 13 persons whose family members had been victims 
of improper influence reported that this had occurred only once. However, one 
respondent reported as many as eleven incidents. Both Swedish prosecutors 
and judges did report that family members had been victimised, but only two 
cases respectively were reported by each group of judges, while the remaining 
ten were targeted at families of prosecutors. For Finland, five of the victims 
belonged to the family of a prosecutor, and five belonged to the family of a 
general court judge. 
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Different professional roles, different perpetrators 
The two judge categories and the prosecutors have dissimilar professional 
roles. They are also involved in transactions with different types of people in 
different kinds of cases. Such differences are illustrated in this chapter, in 
which we describe and analyse the forms of improper influence, in what kinds 
of situations they occur, and who is perceived to be behind the attempt at 
improper influence. 
Earlier research 
According to earlier research, harassment and threats against prosecutors and 
judges usually occur over the telephone or in personal interaction (RKP rapport 
1994:2; Brå 2005:18). An unexpected finding in earlier Brå research was that a 
number of prosecutors, in distinction from other professional groups in the 
study, had learned about serious threats through tips/information from others. 
This was the case for one-third of all threats against prosecutors.  
Yet, the threat is mostly explicated in the working place. In a study conducted 
by the Swedish National Central Police, one prosecutor out of five and one 
judge out of ten who had been threatened was victimised in their leisure time 
(Rikskriminalpolisen) (RKP rapport 1994:2; see also Åklagarväsendet rapport 
1995:7; Brå 2005:18).  
In a German study, corruption attempts against judges were found to be both 
spontaneous and of planned nature. This feature distinguished them from other 
professional groups such as customs officers, police officers, and probation 
staff, since members of these groups mostly confront only one type of 
corruption attempt (Mischkowitz et al. 2000). In the cases described in the 
German study, the prosecutors usually reported that the perpetrator was trying 
to find out what the prosecution contained, or other details of the case, while 
the cases against judges mostly involved the observation that certain individual 
interpreters were being used to a very high degree (Mischkowitz et al. 2000).  
One approach that some individual officials apply and many authorities have 
adopted as a policy is that no gifts of any kind are to be accepted (Brå 2005:18; 
Brå 2007; Nordqvist 2003). In order to avoid giving offence to the person 
presenting the gift, certain kinds of simple gifts may be accepted on behalf of 
the entire office and displayed for instance in the lunch/coffee room. In this 
way, an attempt is made to avoid rumours of improper/improper offers (cf. 
Nordqvist 2003). 
As observed above, improper offers/corruption directed at prosecutors and 
judges are rare. The previous Brå study provides a considerable amount of 
information regarding what the offers were about. For the prosecutors, in one 
case out of two, it was a free meal, while the picture was more varied among 
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the judges (Brå 2005:18). Overall, the survey responses indicated that the 
reported improper offers were of a relatively minor nature. 
The most usual forms of harassment were unpleasant telephone calls, 
unpleasant mail, e-mail or ordinary mail, and furthermore that somebody 
blaming the prosecutor or the judge made a complaint to the ombudsman, a 
counter-report, or a report alleging misconduct in office (Brå 2005:18).  
Threats, violence, harassment and corruption attempts usually take place 
already during the criminal investigation, or before or when the verdict is 
announced in the courtroom (Harris et al. 2001; Mischkowitz et al. 2000; Brå 
2005:18). Even so, threatening letters or the like may appear also after the 
court verdict has been passed, but this is not usual (Brå 2005:18; Harris et al. 
2001; Junninen 2007). 
Influence at the workplace 
Regardless of the type of incident, the usual feature is that the influence is 
exerted at the place of work. One exception is damage to property, since this 
typically targeted the car or the home. 
Harassment 
In both countries, the most common forms of harassment were unpleasant 
telephone calls, letters, e-mails or SMS’s to the workplace. 
In Sweden, 43 per cent of those who reported having been victims of 
harassment said that the incident was of this kind. In Finland, this proportion 
was even larger (67 %). Table 7 shows the distribution of different forms of 
harassment in the Swedish and the Finnish data. 
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Table 7. The most common forms of harassment during the preceding 18 
months, by respondent group, Finland and Sweden, % 
Sweden Finland
Prosecutors General court Administrative court Total Prosecutors General court Administrative court Total
(N=111) judges (N=40) judges (N=19) (N=170) (N=57) judges (N=44) judges (N=17) (N=118)
38.7 52.5 47.4 42.9 57.9 75.0 76.6 66.9
5.4 12.5 15.8 8.2 12.3 15.9 17.6 14.4
Indications of stalking 21.6 7.5 10.6 17.0 7.0 2.3 - 5.9
6.3 5.0 - 5.3 1.8 6.8 5.9 4.2
- - 9.327.9 22.5 26.3 26.5 19.3
Telephone call, letter, 
e-mail, or SMS to the 
workplace
Complaint to 
ombudsman, police 
etc.
Telephone call, letter, 
e-mail or SMS to the 
private sphere
Type of harassment
Other
 
A Swedish judge relates an earlier event: 
“I received an e-mail […] that contained an indirect threat, saying like “it 
only costs x crowns to have somebody killed”. The e-mail, however, was 
sent to a number of other recipients besides myself, and was obviously 
written by someone with mental problems. I felt that the message was 
unpleasant to receive but it has not influenced me in any way afterwards.” 
A second common problem in both countries was complaints to the 
Ombudsman, complaints to a superior or to the police, in which the actual 
objective was understood to be harassment.  
A third frequent form of harassment comprised stalking. This form was more 
common in Sweden than in Finland, and was experienced particularly often by 
Swedish prosecutors (22 %). Of the 13 persons in the Swedish data who 
reported indications of stalking, 12 were prosecutors.  
Telephone calls, letters, e-mails or SMS’s to the private sphere were less 
common forms of harassment, accounting for only 5 per cent of the cases. 
Several respondents pointed out how easy it is to make observations 
concerning them. A Swedish prosecutor wrote: 
“Information regarding my home address was sought on the internet. This 
was done through the internet page [name] that published address data. 
Since I’ve got an uncommon family name, this could be done in a few 
minutes.” 
Comparing the two countries, the category “other” was much larger in Sweden 
than in Finland. It is not clear why the previous answer alternatives were so 
often rejected by the Swedish respondents. It may be that since the harassment 
questions were presented first, they have captured some problem incidents that 
would strictly speaking belong to the next questions (threats, vandalism). 
However, if this was the case, the outcome also indicates that the Swedish 
respondents were more often at a loss as to which incident to report from 
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among several different ones, since they not only had experienced more than 
one victimisation incident more frequently, but had also experienced a larger 
variety of kinds of incidents. For respondents with multiple victimisation 
experiences, the questionnaire gave the instruction to select the one that was 
the “most unpleasant”, but the formulation of this question may not have 
worked as intended. 
Looking at the Swedish problem descriptions provides a partial answer: 
Swedish respondents seemed overall to have had more varied experience than 
the Finnish ones, and the option “other” would therefore be more likely chosen. 
The case descriptions provided in annex 1, however, also give the impression 
that many incidents reported here would actually belong in to the next 
category, that of “threats”. Being the first alternative, harassment seems to have 
attracted many problem experiences of other kinds as well. 
Case descriptions for both countries are provided in Annex 1. 
Threats 
Table 8 indicates what kinds of threats the respondents reported. There is a 
striking difference between the two countries: in Finland, threats presented in 
personal confrontations are much less frequent than in Sweden: three cases in 
Finland, against 18 in Sweden. The corresponding Swedish percentage was 
four times the Finnish one (26 % vs. 7 %). 
Correspondingly, the proportion of threats using communications media to the 
workplace was more than three out of four in Finland, but less than one-half in 
Sweden. This is in line with a similar difference regarding harassment. 
Furthermore, the role of indirect threats was slightly more prominent in 
Sweden than in Finland. 
Table 8. Type of threat, preceding 18 months, by respondent group, Finland 
and Sweden, %. 
Sweden Finland
Prosecutors General court Administrative court Total Prosecutors General court Administrative court Total
(N=42) judges (N=12) judges (N=14) (N=24) judges (N=13) judges (N=5)
Type of threat
By telephone, letter, e-mail, or 
SMS to the workplace
By telephone, letter, e-mail or 
SMS to the private sphere
By tips or secondary sources
35.7 33.3 57.1 43.1 79.2 76.9 80.0 78.6
In person threat 23.8 50.0 7.1 26.2 8.3 7.7 - 7.1
7.7 - 2.4
7.1 - 7.1 6.2 4.2 7.7 - 4.8
9.5 - 7.1 7.7 -
8.3 - 20.0 7.1Other, n.a. 23.8 16.7 21.4 15.4
 
Comparing respondent groups, it turns out that the high proportion of 
personally presented threats in Sweden primarily concerns general court 
judges, but also – less prominently – prosecutors. The Swedish administrative 
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court judges have a similar profile to all Finnish respondent groups, with 
threats primarily received as communications to the workplace. 
This observation could mean that Swedish general court judges are most 
exposed to direct personal confrontations in which threats can be presented, 
followed by Swedish prosecutors, while the other respondent groups would 
seem to be much less vulnerable to such problems. The Swedish court 
procedure may provide more opportunities for personal exchanges than the 
Finnish one. For administrative courts, the finding would likely reflect the 
lower exposure to client or similar contacts, because of the predominantly 
written procedure, in which context personal confrontations are not common. 
Regarding the option “other”, two Finnish prosecutors explained: 
- “telephone call to my home, said nothing” 
- “encountering a difficult client in a public place”. 
In this context, one administrative court judge reported, in response to the 
section in the survey on threats, having been contacted by a representative of a 
non-governmental organization that focuses on European due process.  
In Sweden, the judges in administrative courts said in eight cases out of 14 that 
the threat was presented by telephone, letter, e-mail or SMS to the workplace. 
The remaining replies were scattered evenly across the other alternatives.  
In six cases out of twelve, the Swedish general court judges had received the 
threat in person. In four cases it was made for example by a telephone call to 
the workplace.  
Among the Swedish prosecutors, three types of threats are discernible. First, 15 
out of 42 victimised prosecutors said that the threat was made for example by a 
telephone call to the workplace, 11 reported a threat that was made in person, 
and seven said that the threat came as a tip or from a secondary/indirect source. 
Of the eight respondents who had learned about the threat by a tip, seven were 
prosecutors.  
Also in the earlier Swedish study, tips about threats were relatively common 
among prosecutors. Other studies of improper influence indicate that it is 
difficult to make judgements about threats that are not directly made to the 
person they attempt to influence (Brå 2009; Brå 2008:8; Brå 2005:18). Since 
the victim does not meet the perpetrator, it is not possible to judge from his/her 
behaviour how likely it is that the threat is also going to become real. At times, 
tips concerning threats may come from persons whose identity must be 
protected, and this makes it difficult to have an open exchange about the 
influence attempt and consequently to make a clear assessment of the threat. 
Tips by offenders indicating that somebody is going to harm the prosecutor 
also need not have any reality basis but may have other objectives (such as 
deflect the interest away from the one who is providing the tip, or to gain 
status). 
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This finding raises the question of possible differences in awareness between 
the two countries. The Swedish prosecutors and judges may be more aware of 
problems studied here, and consequently they may also take note more often of 
indirect hints received from the police or other sources, and report these as 
instances of improper influence. Furthermore, the police-prosecutor interaction 
may be more intensive in Sweden than in Finland; also this might explain part 
of the larger volume of indirect hints/tips in Sweden. 
Case descriptions for both countries are provided in Annex 2. 
Damage to property 
In the Swedish data, as many as 12 of the 13 persons who reported that they 
had been victims of damage to property said that the damage was done to 
private property. The target was the apartment/house or parts of the house, in 
particular the front door, but also the car. The damage concerned many kinds 
of targets: mail boxes were damaged, cars were scratched, wheels taken from 
the family car, or parts of the apartment or property inside of the apartment 
were taken. The incidents in which guns were fired into the respondent’s 
apartment were not seen as damage to property but as threats, difficult as they 
may be to place under the given incident categories. 
A Swedish general court judge comments: 
“Several of my colleagues and my boss have been victims of relatively 
serious vandalism at their homes, and also to threats over the telephone 
and the Internet. I consider this to be very serious, and it causes me a 
considerably amount of concern. That I have not been personally 
victimised is probably a matter of chance, or pure good luck. The risk that 
the perpetrator is successful, that is to have an influence, is, I’m afraid, not 
non-existent, however professional we judges may be. In any case, they 
have succeeded in influencing our routines and security attitudes, and 
creating an atmosphere of uneasiness/tension. This is of course totally 
unacceptable and must be prevented.” 
The Finnish respondents gave only two examples, both of a not very serious 
character. The low number of incidents of damage to property does not allow 
for detailed analysis except that clearly, Swedish prosecutors and judges had 
more experiences of damage to property than did their Finnish colleagues. 
However, incidents of a more serious nature have been occasionally reported in 
Finland in the media, but were not captured by our survey. 
Violence 
Violence was rare overall: seven Swedish and five Finnish respondents had 
experienced physical violence in the preceding 18 months. 
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None of the seven Swedish respondents who reported violent incidents had 
been in need of medical treatment as a consequence of the violence. This 
indicates that the violence brought forth in the responses was primarily non-
serious. This is also in line with earlier research as presented above.  
For the Finnish respondents, the finding is very similar: out of the five victims, 
four had not been in need of medical treatment as a consequence of the 
violence (one did not respond to this question). 
Corruption 
The instances of inappropriate offers reported by the prosecutors and the 
judges were of several kinds. The examples provided in the Swedish data 
comprised offers of free meals, candy, other objects, money, internal benefit,
12
 
and offering something that could be bought at a very good price.  
In the Finnish data, one offer was described as an “offer of services”, the other 
one was a percentage of the damage compensation demanded in the complaint. 
This means that the few bribery/corruption-related cases found in the survey 
were rather minor. Of course, also these incidents would deserve a concrete 
description which is not available in the current data. 
It might not be likely that those who might have accepted bribes report this in a 
survey. Nevertheless, this finding would mostly support the conventional 
understanding, also supported by current Transparency International data on 
perceptions, that these two countries are on the low side when bribery of civil 
servants is concerned. 
THE STAGE OF THE PROCESS AT WHICH THE 
INFLUENCE OCCURS 
Prosecutors are victimised during an early stage of the process, while judges 
experience problems in connection with court proceedings and/or in the 
exchange of documents. 
According to the survey, it is not possible to say much about at what stage the 
damage to property, the violence or the inappropriate offers occurred. The 
number of victims of such attempts of influence was too small for this. 
For harassment and threats, the findings are shown in Table 9. 
 
                                                 
12
 By “internal”, the respondent referred to the bureaucracy: a superior or a colleague had 
attempted to exert influence with reference to promotion or other advantages in office. 
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Table 9. The stage of the criminal procedure at which the harassment or threat 
occurred. 
Stage Sweden Finland
Harassment Threats Harassment Threats
During exchange of documents in the 
administrative court
In trial / oral hearings / hearings on 
remand
Appeal to higher court /second instance 
administrative court
Before or during the police investigation 27.2
4.1
While waiting for verdict 4.9
6.0 33.4 16.7
When bringing charges 8.0 4.4 13.7 16.7
8.8 - 4.8
25.7 23.5 38.4 33.4
4.4 - 2.4
11.7 16.2 12.3 4.8
After the verdict took legal force 11.1 8.8 17.9 19.0
No response 6.4 10.3 - -
 
The follow-up questions were optional, and consequently there is a degree of 
internal non-response. The answers indicate, however, that about one 
harassment incident out of three occurs before or during the police 
investigation. A second point with a high risk is the main trial or the oral 
hearings. Many judges and prosecutors wrote about the need to improve the 
security of the court building but often also of its surroundings. As a Swedish 
prosecutor explains: 
“Just one example about our risks: In connection with hearings on remand 
during week-ends or holidays, in [big city] prosecutors must travel using 
public transport to [suburb]. After the session is closed, which may be late 
at night, we need to walk from the detention centre/court to [a station], and 
there it may happen that a suspect who was not detained is travelling with 
you on the same train. Similar situations occur after a late court session. 
This is mainly a security concern of courts.”  
A Finnish prosecutor comments in part on a similar dilemma: 
“It is important to make it easier for prosecutors to move around. A 
prosecutor must in no case travel by public transport but by his own car, 
including parking space in a protected place. It should also be 
reconsidered whether prosecutors should be always available by telephone 
with their direct numbers – since prosecutors must always answer the 
telephone, also their location is simultaneously revealed. Prosecutors who 
work in different locations must be able to move safely. If for instance 
your office is in one building and the client reception is in an adjacent 
building, it is ridiculously easy to get at the prosecutor, for example by 
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one person asking to see him in the client reception, while other members 
of the group lie in wait along the open and unprotected route he has to use 
from the office to the client reception. It would be important to have a 
security guard escort in major cases.” 
Prosecutors and judges are dissimilar in the sense that prosecutors enter the 
legal procedure at an earlier stage, and they therefore also experience attempts 
at improper influence at an earlier stage, and more frequently. Only 17 per cent 
of the Swedish prosecutors who reported incidents of harassment said that 
these had occurred after the main trial. For Swedish general court judges, the 
corresponding proportion was 43 per cent, and for their colleagues in 
administrative courts as high as 58 per cent. 
Several Swedish judges do, however, maintain that prosecutors are more often 
victimised even in court, partly because they are more visible as individuals, 
but also because of organisational factors. A Swedish judge explains:  
“For the time being, judges have mostly been spared attempts at improper 
influence. Probably judges are felt to be relatively neutral in comparison to 
the prosecutors. The risk of influence is understood to be relatively low in 
court premises because judges use “internal routes” when going to the 
courtroom. This must be much worse for the prosecutors who usually use 
routes open to the general public. It has been understood that the 
prosecutors should have close contact with the complainants who are to be 
heard and who are staying in the areas open to the public. Considering 
this, it may be difficult to arrange ‘separate entries for prosecutors if the 
situation of the complain-ants is not improved simultaneously, since the 
complainants may indeed be subjected to improper influence in the public 
areas.” 
The stage where the threats occur is similar to that of harassment. Threats 
occur primarily before or during the police investigation, and in connection 
with the main trial. As was the case with harassment, prosecutors report 
attempts at influence at an early stage of the procedure. 
THE PERPETRATORS 
Perpetrators identified in earlier research 
In the previous Swedish study on improper influence, prosecutors and judges 
thought that it was generally a single individual who was behind the serious 
incidents of harassment. According to both prosecutors and judges, mostly 
mentally disturbed persons and querulants were responsible for these serious 
incidents (Brå 2005:18). Also individual offenders and persons in desperate 
situations were thought to be responsible for a large proportion of the 
harassment incidents. Prosecutors, more often than judges, had observed that 
 37 
various kinds of organised crime and activist organisations were responsible 
for some attempts at improper influence. 
Also in regards of serious threats, as a rule single individuals were thought to 
be responsible. The Swedish prosecutors thought the persons responsible 
usually were individuals suffering from a mental disturbance, or individual 
offenders or drug addicts. The Swedish judges named the same offender 
categories, with the exception of the individual offenders (Brå 2005:18). 
Exactly as was the case with harassment, persons from different kinds of 
organised criminal groups were indicated both in the replies of the Swedish 
prosecutors and the judges. However, the number of respondents who thought 
that organised crime was involved was very low. 
Some earlier studies maintain that it is not possible to identify a particular 
personality profile in regards to those who direct threats or violence at persons 
working in the criminal justice system. Focusing on personality profiles may 
therefore be risky and lead to potential offenders remaining undetected (Weiner 
and Hardenbergh, 2001) 
An American judge maintains that young offenders are a risk factor: they do 
not have the same self-control and they may act out in the courtroom, in 
particular if they are gang members, and they are trying to gain status or 
retaliate against other gang members (Geiger, 2001; cf. also Brå 2008:8). Apart 
from lack of experience and a wish to display strength to a gang, also alcohol 
and drugs may render people unpredictable. According to a Swedish study, 
more than one judge and prosecutor out of five who reported that they had been 
threatened thought that the perpetrator was under the influence of alcohol, 
narcotic substances or other chemicals at the time the threat was made (RKP 
rapport 1994:2). 
Perpetrators in the current survey 
Harassment 
Many kinds of persons may be guilty of harassment. Table 10 shows what 
kinds of perpetrators were responsible for the harassment, according to the 
perception of the respondents. When interpreting the figures, it must be borne 
in mind that the question was about the “most unpleasant” incident, if the 
respondent had experienced more than one incident. This means that, in the 
case of respondents with multiple victimisations, the identity of the person 
guilty of the “most unpleasant” incident will override all the other perpetrators. 
Since multiple victimisation was not very frequent, this may not be a serious 
problem. However, it does suggest that a more detailed questionnaire might 
yield slightly different perpetrator profiles than we found with the current 
questionnaire. The difference would, however, obviously be leaning towards 
the less serious perpetrators, and therefore, for considerations related to 
prevention, not of a crucial nature. 
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Table 10. Perpetrators of harassment, preceding 18 months, by respondent 
category, Finland and Sweden, % 
Finland Sweden
Person with an intoxicant problem 5.3 2.3 5.9 4.4 2.5 -
Mentally disturbed person 26.3 43.2 5.9 19.5 27.5 15.8
Person in desperate situation 14.0 9.1 17.6 14.2 17.5 15.8
Querulant 3.5 25.0 11.8 14.2 25.0 52.6
Individual offender 17.5 - - 12.4 12.5 -
Political activist 3.5 2.3 5.9 4.4 - 5.3
Member of youth gang - - - 5.3 5.0 -
Member of prison gang 1.8 - - - - -
Member of mc gang 5.3 - - 6.2 - -
- - - 0.9 - -
-
Business/entrepreneur - 2.3 5.9 1.8 - -
Unknown - - - 4.4 5.0 10.5
Someone else / no answer 19.3 13.6 47.1 1.8 5.0 -
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
prosecutors 
(n=57)
Member of eastern European 
criminal group
Member of other organised criminal 
group
Organised criminal group or gang 
total
prosecutors 
(n=113)
general court 
judges (n=44)
administrative court 
judges (n=17)
3.5 - - 10.6
10.6 - - 17.7 5.0 -
administrative court 
judges (n=19)
general court 
judges (n=40)
-
 
For multiple victims, the prioritisation of the “most unpleasant” incident has 
the effect that more trivial cases are concealed behind the most unpleasant one. 
This does not exaggerate the prevalence of serious/unpleasant incidents but 
deflates the rates for less serious incidents. 
Most often, the perpetrator was a “mentally disturbed” person or a person with 
an “intoxicant problem” (these two may be hard to distinguish). Also persons 
in a desperate situation were mentioned often. An additional quite large 
category was querulants, persons who obsessively feel wronged and go to court 
for the sake of principle. This kind of perpetrator was particularly often 
mentioned in Swedish replies.
13
  
Persons from organised criminal groups or gangs were particularly frequent in 
the Swedish replies (one out of five); a smaller number of such perpetrators 
                                                 
13
 The Swedish language has a special expression for this kind of person: “rättshaverist” which 
seems to be commonly used among Swedish professionals. (A very rough translation would be 
“legal wreckage”.) A somewhat corresponding colloquial expression is used also in Finnish 
(“käräjäpukari”; “court bully”) but it is used much less broadly, and also may not embrace 
quite the same connotations as its Swedish equivalent. This is a highly interesting observation 
if one considers the degree to which concepts like this can be translated in targeted or general 
population victimisation research. 
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were also mentioned in the Finnish data (one out of ten). For both countries, 
this kind of perpetrators concentrated almost exclusively on prosecutors. 
In Finland, the option “someone else” was chosen rather often. Of the Finnish 
prosecutors, nine chose this option. In these cases, the perpetrators were parties 
to civil and criminal trials, but also legal counsel (twice), and the police 
(twice).
14
  
Of the Finnish general court judges, six responded “someone else”. Of these, 
three were legal counsels, one was a defendant, one was a prosecutor, and one 
was an activist with an interest in the administration of justice (the latter 
appeared also in the responses of the administrative court judges mentioned 
below). 
Finally, of the Finnish administrative court judges, seven gave additional 
information regarding the option “someone else”. In this group, a non-
governmental organization that focuses on European due process was 
mentioned three times; another three were parties in administrative appeals or 
their representatives; and one was a “local politician”. 
Overall, in the majority of the harassment incidents, the perpetrators were 
perceived to be individual actors fitting in to one of three categories: persons 
with mental disturbances/intoxicant problem, persons in a desperate situation, 
and querulants. These groups of persons were mentioned numerous times by 
both the prosecutors and the two categories of judges. 
Some comments by Swedish prosecutors:  
”In practice, it seems that both professional criminals and mentally 
disturbed offenders understand in 95 % of the cases that the prosecutor is 
only doing his job / representing the authority.” 
“Some groups have now passed a limit that used to be sacred”. 
”Actions against biker gangs and other criminal groups are increasing” 
A judge in a Swedish administrative court on migration had this to say: 
“I and my family have been threatened because I, in my position as judge, 
have not supported an appeal concerning the revocation of a driver’s 
licence [of an immigrant]. This happened after the court verdict was 
passed.”  
A Swedish general court judge explains: 
“My responses about being harassed relate to family cases (custody 
disputes). It is not unusual that the parties in such cases become aggressive 
                                                 
14
 These were, as described by the respondents: (1) the plaintiff; (2) the defendant; (3) the 
spouse of the defendant; (4) an ordinary person; (5) the prosecution was about an issue that 
was embarrassing to him; (6) a person with a foreign background; (7) legal counsel; (8) the 
overenthusiastic counsel of the defendant after having lost the case in the general court; (9) the 
police; (10) the police; (11) a person who writes in an American body-building magazine about 
the effects of supplements. 
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and threatening when the decision is against them. They often make 
telephone calls and want to have justice or ask for endless 
reconsiderations.” 
Threats 
Threats could be expected to be somewhat more serious than harassment cases, 
and consequently, their perpetrators might be somewhat dissimilar from the 
group of harassers.  
Table 11 Perpetrators of threats, preceding 18 months, by respond-ent 
category, Finland and Sweden, % 
Finland Sweden
Person with an intoxicant problem 13 7.7 - - 8.3 7.1
Mentally disturbed person 30.4 53.8 - 14.3 16.7 42.9
Person in desperate situation 4.3 - 20 4.8 8.3 7.1
Querulant 8.7 7.7 20 2.4 25 21.4
Individual offender 8.7 - - 19 16.7 -
Political activist - - - 7.1 - 7.1
Member of youth gang - - - 4.8 - -
Member of prison gang - - - - - -
Member of mc gang 8.7 - - 11.9 - -
- - - - - -
-
Business/entrepreneur - 7.7 20 - - -
Unknown 4.3 - - 2.4 8.3
Someone else / no answer 21.7 15.4 40 9.6 16.7 14.3
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Organised criminal group or gang 
total
prosecutors 
(n=5)
general court 
judges (n=13)
administrative court 
judges (n=14)
general court 
judges (n=12)
administrative court 
judges (n=17)
prosecutors 
(n=23)
Member of eastern European 
criminal group
Member of other organised criminal 
group
- 7.7 - 23.8 - -
8.7 7.7 40.5 - -
 
According to Table 11, the perpetrators actually seem to be rather similar to 
those involved in the harassment cases. Querulants are a bit less prevalent in 
comparison to harassment cases, and so are persons who are in a desperate 
situation. Individual offenders are equally prevalent among perpetrators 
making the threats as they were among the harassers. 
The most striking difference when compared to harassers is the high frequency 
of perpetrators of threats who were related to organised criminal groups or 
gangs. Such persons were clearly more common in the context of threats than 
in the harassment situations, and clearly more common in Sweden than in 
Finland. All Swedish respondents who said that the perpetrators came from 
organised criminal groups or gangs were prosecutors. As many as 40 per cent 
of those who threatened Swedish prosecutors came from organised criminal 
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groups or gangs (most unpleasant/disquieting incident), while this figure was 
nine per cent for Finnish prosecutors. 
The option “someone else” was also selected a few times. Apart from the given 
options, some of the Finnish judges said they had also been threatened by 
representatives of a non-governmental organization that focuses on European 
due process, and legal counsels. A Swedish district court judge who selected 
“someone else” explained the threat as follows: 
“A high-ranking director, since a middle-level director had happened to 
reveal that the procedure when internally filling higher positions was just a 
‘game for the gallery’, and that it had already been decided beforehand 
who was to be appointed. These were so-called ‘nice and law-abiding’ 
persons.” 
One of the Swedish judges expressed concern about the kinds of clients whose 
cases are dealt with in the administrative courts as follows: 
“There are often mentally unstable persons in immigration cases, and I 
believe that one day, some dangerous situations may occur.” 
Thus, as was the case concerning harassment, the perpetrators are usually 
persons with a direct involvement in the cases, such as plaintiffs and 
defendants and their family, and legal counsels. However, the range of possible 
parties guilty of threats was very broad, and included also unexpected types of 
parties, such as a local politician, the respondent’s superiors, the police, and an 
appeal court judge. Threats could even be presented by total outsiders who 
were for instance mobilised by publicity given by the media. 
Vandalism, violence, corruption 
The respondents reported only a very small number of cases of vandalism, 
violence, and corruption. Therefore, no percentages about their perpetrators are 
provided below.  
Not surprisingly, the perpetrator remained unknown in particular in vandalism 
victimisation. The identified perpetrators of such attempts at improper 
influence primarily comprised single individuals (individual offenders without 
a gang connection, persons in a desperate situation, persons with a mental 
disturbance), but there was also a proportion of organised and system-
threatening crime (members of biker gangs or some other organised criminal 
groups, and political activists). 
In the few cases of violence, the responses were brief, and did not provide full 
descriptions of the perpetrators. A Finnish prosecutor had been attacked by an 
individual offender (defendant). Swedish prosecutors told about a mentally 
disturbed person, a person in a desperate situation, and a member of a biker 
gang. A Swedish judge described a similar incident that occurred after the 
verdict, when he was attacked by an individual offender. Finally, Swedish 
administrative court judges had been assaulted by a person in a desperate 
situation and by a political activist. 
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There were also only a few corruption attempts, and case descriptions were 
brief or missing. A Finnish general court judge told about how a mentally 
disturbed person had offered a percentage of the compensation demanded in 
the trial. Swedish prosecutors had on three occasions been offered bribes by 
individual offenders, and in one case by a person in a desperate situation. A 
Swedish administrative court judge had been offered a bribe by a mentally 
disturbed person and a party in a case of private prosecution. Thus, the 
corruption cases were mostly about bribes. However, corruption being a vague 
term, the question also captured a case in which a Swedish general court judge 
maintained that the corruption was about internal management in the 
organisation, to the effect that the top manager discriminated against/in favour 
of certain employees. 
WHAT HAD BEEN DONE ABOUT THE ATTEMPTS 
AT IMPROPER INFLUENCE 
This chapter presents earlier research, and shows who is notified about 
attempts at influence. 
Responses to improper influence according to earlier 
research 
The most usual consequence of harassment and threats against Swedish 
prosecutors and judges was that they had at least once considered changing 
jobs or quitting (one-third of the judges who reported threats, more than one-
fourth of the prosecutors who reported harassment) (Brå 2005:18). Only a 
small proportion of the victims said that they had been granted sick-leave or 
that they had at least once been influenced to the effect that their functioning as 
a civil servant had been impeded as a consequence of harassment or threats 
(1.3–3.8 per cent of those Swedish prosecutors, respectively judges, who said 
that they had been harassed or threatened). Many more reported that they had 
seriously considered whether to order a measure, or avoided a case that they 
should have taken (11–15 per cent). 
In a study of violence, threats and harassment against judges in Pennsylvania in 
the United States, the researchers found that violence was most likely to make 
judges change their behaviour (Harris 2001).
15
 Also an “inappropriate 
approach” could have such effects, but not at all to the same degree. The same 
study showed that threatening behaviour by the prosecuted persons or their 
                                                 
15
 In the earlier Brå study on improper influence, only results concerning the consequences of 
harassment and threats against prosecutors and of harassment against judges were published, 
since it was only with regard to these attempts at influence that the number of victims was 
large enough for statistical conclusions. 
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relatives in the courtroom was broadly tolerated, since this was a common way 
of expressing rage and dissatisfaction with negative decisions. Other studies 
indicate, however, that being victimised has made those affected more 
committed to carrying out their duties (Junninen 2007). 
Earlier research on attempts at improper influence also indicates that there is 
often some kind of relationship between the perpetrator and the victim (Brå 
2008:8; Korsell and Skinnari 2009; Calhoun 2001). When pressure had been 
used against judges and prosecutors, there is a relationship with the perpetrator 
in the sense that they have been involved in the same law suit (Weiner and 
Hardenbergh 2001). Therefore, it is not surprising that it is rare that threats, 
harassment or violence are directed at family members of the prosecutors and 
judges (RKP rapport 1994:2; Åklagarväsendet rapport 1995:7; Junninen 2007; 
Harris et al. 2001). 
According to a Swedish study from 1994, it was more common for male 
prosecutors than for female prosecutors to report having been victimised by 
threats or harassment (20–21 per cent of the men, 15–16 per cent of the 
women) (RKP rapport 1994:2). Among the Swedish judges, the result was the 
reverse, with female judges reporting a higher prevalence of victimisation than 
their male colleagues (9–10 per cent of the men, 12–16 per cent of the women). 
The international research literature also discusses purely preventive measures 
to which victimised judges and prosecutors have resorted. Such measures are 
of many kinds, ranging for example from acquiring a watchdog, or agreeing 
with colleagues on a ”secret signal” to be used when the police should be 
called, to the comment by an American judge, who responded that he 
nowadays wears a gun in the courtroom (Harris et al. 2001). 
Even if the attempts at improper influence dealt with in this report mainly 
concern incidents that have occurred to individual civil servants, there is a 
further dimension to the problem. Even colleagues of victimised judges and 
prosecutors may be afraid of victimisation although they have never been 
subjected to such attempts (Vossekuil et al. 2001). In this way, the 
consequences of attempts at improper influence reach beyond the individual 
civil servant (cf. also Brå 2005:18). An American study also showed that it was 
unusual that individual persons in the court system were directly victimised. 
Instead, the threat was often directed at a group of civil servants (Weiner and 
Hardenbergh 2001). This was interpreted as an indication that the actual target 
was the system itself, rather than individual judges or other actors within the 
system. 
If threats or even violence occur in the courtroom, this is also an attack against 
the function of the judge in general (Harris et al. 2001). It indicates that the 
presiding judge is not able to guarantee order in his/her courtroom. 
Furthermore, the reputation of the courts may be damaged, and if the courts are 
not felt to be safe, this is going to hamper court procedure (Warren 2001; cf. 
also Brå 2008:8). 
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Responses to improper influence according to the 
present study  
Table 12 shows the replies to the question on who the respondent notified 
about the attempt at improper influence. For multiple victims, the question was 
about the “most unpleasant/most serious” incident; this inflates the reporting 
rate if compared to a count that would comprise all incidents. 
The scope of possible persons who may be notified is broad. In the first place, 
incidents of improper influence should be reported to the employer/workplace 
representatives. More than half of the Swedish victims, and a somewhat fewer 
of the Finnish victims, had done this. In Sweden, colleagues were notified 
almost equally often, while in Finland, as many as three victims out of four had 
notified their colleagues about their victimisation (most serious incident). 
Security chiefs/officers were notified more frequently in Sweden than in 
Finland. Also family and friends were informed more often in Sweden than in 
Finland. All respondent groups shared the feature that they had very rarely 
informed the staff representative, the union representative or some other 
person. 
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Table 12. Person notified by the respondent regarding the attempt at improper 
influence. Sweden and Finland. Per cent. 
Superior 58 59 48
Colleague 54 35 41
Security chief/officer 18 27 37
Police (report) 14 27 41
Relative, family 30 32 37
Friend 15 15 26
Other 2 3 4
Superior 40 48 40
Colleague 75 78 80
Security chief/officer 3 5 -
Police (report) 9 20 -
Relative, family 19 18 -
Friend 10 10 -
Other 7 8 -
Staff or union 
representative or similar
Staff or union 
representative or similar
Harassment 
(171)
Threats (68)
Vandalism, violence, 
corruption attempts (27)
Harassment 
(118)
Threats (40)
Vandalism, violence, 
corruption attempts (5)
Finland
Sweden
- - -
2 2 11
 
Support measures 
Only eight Swedish respondents said that they had received some kind of 
psycho-social support. This comprised in practice support from a family 
member or friend (4 cases), a colleague (1 case), his/her superior (1 case), and 
a therapist (1 case). 
In Finland, similarly, four respondents said they had received psycho-social 
support. Three of these four cases involved support from a family member or 
friend, and one was support from a colleague. For both countries, this would 
mean either that no organised support had been available to the victims at all, 
or that they did not consider that they were in need of such support. 
Preventive and alleviating measures 
Two survey questions dealt with whether either the local workplace or the 
central authority had changed their routines or guidelines as a consequence of 
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the attempts at improper influence. The amount of detail was of course not 
even near the one found in the survey responses. The alternatives provided in 
the questionnaire were not fully in line with what the survey respondents had 
suggested. In possible future surveys, it might be better to use answer 
alternatives that come closer to the perspective of the respondent. 
Measures taken at the local workplace 
For both countries, the low proportion of those who replied positively in 
regards to each measure indicates that not all workplaces had paid a lot of 
attention to problems related to attempts at improper influence (commentary 
along these lines was also received from the survey respondents). 
The local workplace had enhanced visitor routines equally often in both 
countries. Also physical protection measures and improvements in the local 
organisation had been introduced equally often. In Sweden, internal 
communication had been improved clearly more often than in Finland, and a 
protocol for reporting incidents had also been developed much more often in 
Sweden than in Finland. External cooperation (e.g. with the police) had been 
developed a bit more often in Sweden than in Finland. 
Table 13. Judges and prosecutors who said that the local workplace had 
changed routines as a consequence of attempts at improper influence. Sweden 
and Finland. Per cent. 
Finland
Sweden
9.1 3.8Total (1096) 16.7 13.7 13.4 11.4
6.2 0.3
Administrative court 
judges (178)
19.1 14.0 15.7 16.3 14.0 4.5
General court judges 
(387)
9.6 4.4 9.6 8.5
9.1 6.0
Prosecutors EBM 
(78)
11.5 21.8 11.5 10.3 12.8 7.7
Prosecutors ÅM 
(450)
22.9 20.2 16.0 12.2
1.9 1.3
Total (673) 16.8 4.9 14.6 2.8 5.5 2.1
Administrative court 
judges (154)
18.2 2.6 12.3 -
3.5 1.2
General court judges 
(264)
20.5 6.8 18.6 5.7 9.5 3.4
Prosecutors  (255) 12.2 4.3 11.8 1.6
Developed 
external 
cooperation (e.g. 
with the police)
Communication 
and self-
protection
Visitor routines 
enhanced
Developed the internal 
dialogue (open 
communication about 
problems)
Physical 
protection and 
developing the 
local organisation 
Improved routines 
for reporting 
incidents
 
In both countries, it was unusual to have introduced communications and self-
protection training. Overall, the local workplace had been more active in 
Sweden than in Finland, in particular with regard to developing internal 
 47 
communication and enhancing reporting routines, both of these being 
approaches that are related to increasing awareness about the problem.  
Some respondents also maintained that the circumstances in the workplace are 
good with regard to security and preventive measures. 
One Swedish judge explained that judges who had been subjected to attempts 
at improper influence had been provided improved lighting with movement 
detectors at their home, demonstrating that the workplace is able to take 
measures that are introduced in another physical location. 
Measures taken by a central authority 
The central authority in Sweden had given new guidelines of all kinds 
systematically more often than in Finland. The difference is marked, with most 
measures four times more frequent in Sweden. Thus, both the local workplace 
and the central authority had been much more active in this matter in Sweden. 
Considering the scope and seriousness of the experienced problems, this is well 
justified. However, the Finnish situation does not appear to be so well under 
control that similar measures would not be needed. 
For Sweden, those prosecutors from the Prosecution Authority who 
commented on what the central authority had done said that the Authority has 
employed a security chief and that a personal protection programme was being 
developed. Several prosecutors (in the Prosecution Authority, ÅM, and the 
Economic Crime Authority, EBM) said that there is ongoing work within the 
Authorities, in particular after some serious attempts at improper influence. 
Some of the respondents expressed their disappointment that there had not yet 
been visible results as a result of these efforts.  
The judges who had commented on the issue said that attempts at improper 
influence had not occurred in their workplace, or said that they didn’t know 
what had been done by their Authority, or said they believe that the Court 
Authority had taken many kinds of measures. 
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Table 14. Judges and prosecutors who said their central authority had issued 
new guidelines in response to attempts at improper influence. Sweden and 
Finland. Per cent. 
Finland
Sweden
Improved external 
cooperation 
Total (673)
Prosecutors ÅM 
(450)
New guidelines or 
physical protection 
and design of the 
workplace 
Changed the internal 
dialogue 
Guide-lines for 
reporting 
incidents
3.1
2.7
1.3
6.2 2.5 4.5 1.8 1.2
2.7 3.5
Prosecutors EBM 
(78)
General court judges 
(387)
Administrative court 
judges (178)
Total (1096)
Changed the 
security strategy / 
plan of the authority
6.3
7.6
3.9
47.8
32.1
12.1
18.0
29.2
Prosecutors (255)
General court judges 
(264)
Administra-tive court 
judges (154)
1.6
4.2 0.8 0.4
7.8 0.6 1.9
20.4
19.2
3.1
7.3
12.0
12.7
7.7
6.5
9.0
9.5
14.9
2.6
10.6
15.2
12.5
10.0
6.4
4.4
7.3
7.3
 
Finnish respondents were of the opinion that very little had been done by the 
central authority regarding this matter. According to the survey replies, 
measures had indeed been undertaken much less often in Finland than in 
Sweden, where awareness of workplace problems has clearly been increasing 
much earlier than in Finland. 
RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE RESPONDENTS 
Suggestions for measures to cope with improper 
influence 
Many respondents described several kinds of problematic situations for which 
they often also had ideas as to what should be done to prevent attempts at 
improper influence and to punish the perpetrators. Below, these findings are 
summarised separately for each respondent group. 
Overall, there was a rather similar range of suggestions in all the respondent 
groups. Their volume was directly proportional to two features: the size of the 
respondent group and the prevalence of problem experiences in each group. 
The volume of comments indicates that the respondents had given quite a lot of 
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thought to the matter. In the analysis below, the comments and suggestions 
have been grouped into six categories. They reflect some basic crime 
prevention approaches: influencing offender motivation (education, reaction, 
punishment and so on), preventive protection measures, being prepared and 
competent if problems occur, and situational aspects (target hardening, security 
technology, designing out crime). In addition, there were suggestions that were 
not easily classified in these categories. 
The suggestions are summarised in Table 15. The frequencies provided in each 
cell simply indicate the number of respondents making the relevant suggestion. 
As these are voluntary suggestions, the frequencies are not a direct indication 
of  
Table 15. A summary of the suggestions. 
Suggestion Finland Sweden
Prosecutors General court judges Administrative court judges Prosecutors General court judges Administrative court judges 
-tough on crime (2) -tougher punishments (1) -tough on crime (1)
-legislative measures (2)
-tough on crime (5)
Being prepared -react promptly, report (2)
-involve the police (3)
-protect personal data (1) -protect personal data (2) -protect personal data (5) -protect personal data (2)
-self-defence (1)
-publicity strategy (3)
-access control
-alarms (1)
-security guards (2)
Design out risks (3) (3) (2) (4)
(3) (1) (7) (1) (1)
(1)
“You’re on your own” (3)
Other  -transparency (1) -better salaries (1)
-legislation to stop going 
to court just for the sake 
of going to court (1)
-prosecutor behaviour 
(1)
Security technology, 
guards
Reorganise working 
routines
-trace telephone calls 
(1)
-access control, metal 
detectors, security guards 
(10)
Education, reaction, 
powers, punishment
Personal and data 
protection
-take the matter seriously 
(3)
-awareness-raising, 
training, workplace 
guidelines (5)
-need to inform the 
general public (1)
-tough on crime, more 
powers to intervene 
(9)
-education through 
publicity (1)
Procedural 
improvements
-technical devices, metal 
detectors (5)
-record telephone calls, 
camera surveillance (2)
-office and courtroom 
logistics (5)
-metal detectors, security 
controls, security guards 
(12)
-record telephone 
conversations (1)
-metal detectors, security 
guards (2)
-improved security, 
metal detectors, 
security guards, police 
(19)
-alarms, camera 
surveillance of homes 
(3)
-improved security, 
metal detectors, 
security guards (2)
-trace telephone calls, 
camera surveillance 
(1)
-awareness-raising, training 
(7)-awareness raising, training 
(5)
-protect personal data 
(5)
-general personal 
protection (4) 
-protect personal 
data, anonymise (32)
-general personal 
protection (8)
-awareness, training, 
instructions, 
guidelines (6)
-security plans/schemes, 
awareness, training (5)
-take the matter 
seriously, threat 
analysis (9)
-awareness, training 
(7)
-general personal 
protection (2)
-take the matter seriously 
(1)
-take the matter 
seriously (2)
-Intervene promptly, 
record, report, support 
from employer / 
workplace (4)
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The suggestions are cited in full in Appendix 1. 
Many suggestions were rather straightforward, emphasising punishments and 
stricter responses to situations involving improper influence. Also, improved 
technical protection of facilities and persons, and in particular the importance 
of the secrecy of personal data was mentioned very often. Many respondents 
stressed the importance of improved awareness, including the recording and 
reporting of incidents. This approach also underlined the responsibilities of the 
employer organisations. In many instances, ideas on how to design out risks 
were presented. All of these merit further study, and it is to be recommended 
that attention be paid to them in the future if problems involving improper 
influence are going to be tackled more systematically than what seems to be 
the case today. 
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Annex 1. Case descriptions of “harassment” 
Case descriptions (Sweden) 
The Swedish prosecutors provided a large number of examples. The events in 
the first group come close to “harassment” but illustrate well that it is not 
always easy to classify problem events: 
 “verbal abuse” 
 “barrister attempted to persuade me not to prosecute” 
 “claims and discussions in connection with negotiations” 
 “unpleasant verbal comments in connection with trial (during breaks in 
the court’s waiting room)” 
 “unpleasant telephone conversation after court with the prosecuted 
person, in which I was criticised for my interpretations” 
Many descriptions resemble threat rather than harassment, an observation in 
clear support of the argument that harassment and threat are not always easily 
distinguished from each other: 
 “aggressive relative after court session” 
 “just insults/bad language and aggressive behaviour by telephone to the 
workplace, usually after decision not to take measures” 
 “insult in telephone conversation” 
 “insults etc. in censored mail” 
 “insults inside and outside of courtroom” 
 “relative of the prosecuted person shouted insults at me in the 
courtroom” 
 “was called ‘fucking idiot’ in town” 
 “unacceptable statements” 
 “threat/attack in courtroom” 
 “threatening attack in courtroom” 
 “attack in waiting area of district court” 
 “direct threats in the courtroom” 
 “confrontation in court by friend of the prosecuted person, he walked 
quickly towards me, and pulled hand from his pocket at me. Police 
pulled his gun believing it was an attack” 
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Some examples show that even bombs may be hard to classify: 
 “bomb” 
 “received a letter in the courtroom from the prosecuted person. On the 
letter was the text ‘letter bomb’” 
Some other examples may be interpreted as indirect threats, or stalking: 
 “letter about me, and behaviour indicating that somebody had been 
behind the door of my home" 
 “filmed by organised criminals” 
 “implicit threats presented to crime investigator in order for him to pass 
on the message to me” 
 “implicit threats in police hearing” 
 “implicit threats in waiting room of the district court” 
Tips from other sources were also mentioned several times: 
 “sentenced persons threatened to kill me; tip from a source” 
 “threat presented to crime investigator” 
 “information provided to me directly during the court procedure, and 
information to investigating policemen” 
Even shooting was mentioned: 
 “shooting into my bedroom” 
 “two shots fired into my bedroom in the middle of the night” 
And finally, a classic way to harass people: 
 “postal packages sent to me from companies and private persons for me 
to take out against payment even though I had not ordered anything” 
 
The Swedish general court judges gave the following descriptions: 
 “legal complaints and attempt to persuade me at the workplace” 
 “statements that resemble ‘implicit threats’” 
 “unpleasant telephone calls, threats of complaint to ombudsman, 
unpleasant behaviour in preliminary hearing” 
 “driving the car home, just after having closed the procedure on a larger 
youth case, I was passed by a car with persons inside whom I 
recognised as part of the audience in the procedure. First, the car 
approached very close to my car, then it pulled to my side where it 
remained for quite some time while they attracted my attention with 
hooting and gesticulations” 
 57 
 “in an arrest session, the suspect committed (and has subsequently been 
sentenced for) a physical attack against the chairman and the 
prosecutor” 
 “burglary” 
“when people have been appointed to offices” 
 
The Swedish administrative court judges provided descriptions as follows: 
 “private prosecution” 
 “threat and damage to my home” 
 “unpleasant telephone calls, threats of prosecution, subtle statements 
drawing close to threats” 
 “damage to property in front of the administrative court building, kind 
of harassment” 
 “car tires slashed, a decapitated pigeon on the stairs, flowers cut off, 
mailbox filled with condoms, bedroom window broken.” 
 
Case descriptions (Finland) 
The Finnish respondents provided much fewer explanatory comments of this 
kind.  
The Finnish prosecutors, in contrast, gave twelve examples (21 %) of “other” 
types of harassment. Some of them happened in court: 
 “unpleasant telephone call to my home, and harassment in court” 
 “harassment in the courtroom” 
 “defamation in courtroom” 
 “improper behaviour in connection with trial” 
 “indications that the State prosecutor is going to hear about this” 
The harassment could also be made in person: 
 “the prosecuted person followed me and shouted from one meter’s 
distance” 
Harassment could also happen by making a criminal charge or in a letter to the 
appeal court: 
 “untrue and insulting claims presented by legal counsel in the letter of 
appeal to the appellate court” 
 “unfounded criminal charge” 
Also the Internet was used as the scene of the harassment: 
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 “abusive messages on the Internet” 
 “entries on the Internet that were insulting, sometimes even threatening; 
and telling me in person: ‘also your time will come…’” 
 “defamation on the prosecuted person’s home page, and threats to make 
criminal charges” 
 “a long-term internet campaign, comprising for example defamatory 
web pages created in my name, etc.” 
 
The Finnish general court judges did not provide detailed incident 
descriptions. 
The Finnish administrative court judges gave only one example: 
“This central association of European legal rights keeps sending mimeos where 
they threaten to influence the career prospects of the judge if the case is not 
handled according to what they want.” 
These explanations also illustrate again that the distinction between harassment 
and threat may be very subjective. Harassment as understood by the 
respondents, obviously, was not just idle bad language on the spur of the 
moment, but sometimes much more than that. 
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Annex 2. Case descriptions of “threats” 
Case descriptions (Sweden) 
prosecutors 
 “implicit threats during the trial” 
 “report from crime investigation that a person had agreed to ‘get me’ 
for a payment of 70,000 SEK” 
 “damage to car” 
 “shot fired into my bedroom” 
 “telephone was tapped” 
 “two rifle shots were fired into my bedroom” 
 “implicit threat in connection with crime investigation” 
 “told about it to police, who then told me” 
general court judges 
 “attitude control and attitude steering using decision-making power in 
appointments to offices that had been biased in favour of certain 
persons in advance; despite that it was still unknown who the other 
candidates might be as the decision was unofficially made” 
administrative court judges 
 “threat on the Internet + damage to property” 
 “letter with threat to murder me” 
 
Case descriptions (Finland) 
prosecutors 
 “telephone call to my home, said nothing” 
 “encountering a difficult client in town” 
general court judges 
 -- 
administrative court judges 
 -- 
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ANNEX 3. SUGGESTIONS BY THE 
RESPONDENTS FOR MEASURES TO PREVENT 
IMPROPER INFLUENCE: prosecutors, general court 
judges, and administrative court judges in Finland and 
Sweden 
Finland 
Prosecutors 
Among the Finnish respondents, the prosecutors had experienced the largest 
amount of problems, and had consequently many suggestions. The suggestions 
ranged over a very broad area, reflecting their broad experience with problems, 
and probably indicating that the issue is of considerable interest for the 
prosecutors, and more so than for the other respondent groups. 
Education, reaction, powers, punishment 
Need to inform the general public 
“Mentally disturbed persons don’t understand that they commit a crime 
when they tell the prosecutor that something unhealthy might happen to 
him/her. Also, businesspeople don’t always understand that a request to 
speed up the process offering a bribe is a crime.” 
Tough on crime, more powers to interfere 
“Internet terror should be responded to much more strictly, and it should 
be possible to remove/stop all inappropriate material” 
“In a case of continuous pressure with the objective of making the 
prosecutor arrive at a given decision: somebody should be able to tell the 
person concerned that he must stop. The problem is that the civil servants 
don’t dare to speak up but they just accept all letters and papers and make 
formal decisions in every single issue, and the thing goes on forever.” 
“I’d wish that the employer agency would organise a hearing to which the 
person making the threats would be obliged to come.” 
“The courts can contribute so that if improper, punishable influence is 
detected, the perpetrators receive significant punishments.” 
“Punishments should be tough.” 
“Re threats in the courtroom: The chair should have the powers to 
intervene directly by fining the perpetrator. It would be very important that 
the behaviour is immediately interrupted.” 
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“In court, there should be a tougher attitude towards improper language, 
today it seems that for example the prosecutor can be called anything 
without consequences.” 
“A further issue that should be considered is how an authority could 
effectively respond to claims and crime allegations that are knowingly 
false. The constituent elements of the offence of false accusation are not 
really met because the complaint is made to an authority responsible for 
ensuring the supervision of legality. Defamation investigations are not 
effective because, according to the general understanding, a representative 
of an authority must tolerate harder criticism than ordinary people.” 
“The most difficult group are persons with serious mental health or 
personality disturbances: concerning these, the State should understand 
and accept that there just exists a group (a small one, though) of people 
who just cannot ever be allowed into society freely and without 
supervision!” 
Being prepared 
Take the matter seriously 
“The employer should take the whole matter more seriously: the superiors 
should be aware of it, and, if something happens, be prepared.” 
“A case of prolonged threats, harassment, and a violent attack at my home 
where also my daughter was much affected: my superior and the State did 
nothing (apart from the police investigation and trial), the perpetrators paid 
no compensation, and I also did not receive anything from the State. I had 
to pay for all the material damages, the broken window, etc., and also the 
medical treatment and therapy for my daughter. This to my mind is totally 
unfair since all this was related to my job. The State should absolutely pay 
all costs straight off, and could then try to get them back from the one who 
caused them. –It was also strange that I had to be active in the 
investigation of the matter. My superior did absolutely nothing, didn’t 
even ask how things are going or help to take the case further. After all, it 
was a matter of my daughter’s mental well-being. Also, there were no 
discussions on how to prevent similar incidents in the future. This 
happened in 1999, i.e. not in the preceding 18 months.” 
Intervene promptly, record, report, support from employer/workplace 
“A prosecutor’s job is not for the timid. Harassment must be responded to 
strongly and immediately, and that will be the end of it. Your reputation 
will be made that it’s not a good idea to try to harass this one.” 
“All attempts at improper influence should be recorded and investigated.” 
“All incidents should be reported to the superior. The cases should be 
collected and reported to the office of the Prosecutor General...” 
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“It is important to indicate that the individual civil servant has the full 
support of other civil servants, of his agency, the Ministry, and in 
particular the central agency; attempts at improper influence attempts 
should be responded to without delay.” 
Awareness, training, instructions, guidelines 
“The employer agency should organise training on how to deal with 
difficult clients.” 
“Some kind of training would be good to have on how to deal with 
aggressive clients.” 
“…there should be a plan for how e.g. the police can intervene 
(emergency phone numbers, good practices etc.)” 
“It would be helpful if the central agency and one’s employer agency 
would provide support in more problematic situations, at least 
psychologically.” 
“… in order to avoid problems caused by unacceptable behaviour, the 
general courts should be given uniform guidelines concerning how to keep 
problem persons in check.” 
“… it would be important to investigate and give instructions regarding the 
participation of civil servants in events organised and financed by business 
enterprises. This is not only in regards to civil servants in the justice 
system, but it should concern all civil servants. All gifts the value of which 
exceeds a cup of coffee should be reported, and as needed investigations 
should be initiated in order to find out whether influence attempts are 
involved.” 
Involve the police 
“Several years ago, the NBI [the National Bureau of Investigation] found 
out that the defendant in my case had been in contact with motorcycle 
gang members about what they should do if the verdict goes against the 
defendant. The NBI informed both the prosecutor and the judge, and gave 
advice as to security measures… The NBI informed the perpetrator that 
his connection to the mc gang is known, and if something happens to us, 
they will immediately know who to suspect.” 
“The general court judge and I both reported the [threat] to the police, and 
the result was a criminal investigation.” 
“A report to the police should be made where appropriate.” 
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Personal and data protection 
Protect personal data 
“Clear guidelines should be given at the workplace on when it is necessary 
to provide detailed information on the prosecutor’s whereabouts.” 
“I guess it would be good in each office to analyse the monitoring of 
visitors, and the availability of telephone numbers and other contact 
information.” 
“It would be important to disseminate information on what to do if you 
want to have a protection order regarding your address etc.” 
“A very central issue for preventing influence attempts is: how can the 
personal data of the civil servants be protected more effectively than is the 
case today?” 
“I have made my address secret because of my work.” 
General personal protection 
“The ease of movement of the prosecutor should be improved (the 
prosecutor should under no circumstances travel with public transport but 
use his own car), including parking space in a protected area.” 
“If any serious threats occur, no lack of resources should be able to 
prevent full protection. This is the task of the employer agency/the state.” 
“There should be protection programmes that are tailor-made according to 
the special features of the case.” 
“If incidents occur, it is most important to get protection from the 
authorities, in particular the police.” 
Security technology and guards 
Improved security, metal detectors, security guards 
“As needed, technical surveillance apparatus and other protection should 
be available at the employer’s cost.” 
“If the case is very significant, a ‘gorilla’ should be provided as an escort.” 
Trace telephone calls, camera surveillance 
“Improper telephone calls have been traced and the caller was caught.” 
Design out risks 
“It would also be important to secure the prosecutor’s movement between 
offices (for instance, going from the office to an adjacent building where 
64 
the client reception is). It is ridiculously easy to get at the prosecutor, for 
example by one person asking to see him in the client reception, while 
other members of the group lie in wait along the open and unprotected 
route he has to use.” 
“In another case, when the defendant pushed my chair in the appeal court 
upon entering the courtroom: this could easily be prevented by some 
rearrangement of the courtroom logistics.” 
“The defendant and the prosecutor should not use the same entrance to the 
courtroom. The defendant must not be brought into the courtroom from 
behind the prosecutor’s back.” 
“The offices (courtrooms, client reception areas) should be designed 
accordingly.” 
“The reception facilities of the office should be constructed with improved 
security in mind. In our city, the clients can walk directly into the rooms of 
the prosecutors.” 
Reorganise working routines 
“Also the availability of the prosecutors should be reconsidered (the 
prosecutor must always answer the telephone, and doing this reveals 
where he/she may be found…). Prosecutorial work should be reorganised 
so that they would as a rule work in pairs.” 
“Recently, prosecutor work has been reorganised so that they work in 
pairs in order to prevent such problems, e.g. in large narcotics cases.” 
“The objective should be that before and during the trial, unknown parties 
should not meet the prosecutors in person, unless it is absolutely 
indispensable in dealing with the case. As a rule, interaction should be 
restricted to telephone and written communications.” 
Procedural improvements 
“In cases of persistent repeated appeals and complaints, the authorities 
responsible for the supervision of legality should condense extensive 
complaint memoranda to the essentials, and ask for explanations only for 
these core issues. It is unreasonable that complaint letters of 20-60 pages 
are directly sent for commentary. The authorities responsible for the 
supervision of legality should first analyse whether the matter is about a 
request for reconsideration of the judgment or about the lawfulness of the 
authority’s actions. The authorities should first ask for clarifications and 
additional explanations regarding unclear complaints, and only after this 
send the complaint for comments. Furthermore, the authorities should 
inform so-called professional complainers after 5-6 obviously unfounded 
complaints that their further complaints concerning the same case are not 
going to be dealt with any more, and no response shall be provided, unless 
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substantially new evidence is presented. From what I know, this is how the 
ECHR [the European Court of Human Rights] deals with professional 
complainers.” 
“You’re on your own”  
Finally, some prosecutors observed that there are situations that cannot be 
anticipated and prevented, and in the end, everyone is on his/her own: 
“[After an unpleasant and threatening episode], for several months I kept 
checking who was outside of the door both when leaving the office and 
when leaving home… I also had my office obtain a gas weapon for me 
that I still have… I considered for quite some time if I should report the 
case to the police, but I then concluded that it is less trouble if I leave it be. 
I thought that that kind of madman just gets provoked by a police report, 
and I’d be threatened some more… Eventually, I have concretely 
internalised and understood that if a client really wants to kill me, this will 
happen, no matter what the State / my employer / the police / Parliament / 
the EU does. I’ll need to walk out of my office door every day in any 
case.” 
“A case of agitated telephone calls: others cannot do anything about such 
situations, you’ll have to solve the problem by calming down the caller on 
your own.” 
“A few years ago, somebody attempted to set fire to my garage. I doubt 
that anybody can prevent these kinds of things.” 
“It is hardly possible to prevent individual random incidents.” 
General court judges 
General court judges were victimised a bit less often than the prosecutors, and 
had a smaller, albeit quite a large number of ideas: 
Education, reaction, powers, punishment 
Tough on crime, legislative measures 
“The workplace or the State cannot do anything about such influence and 
pressure attempts. The Bar Association should be tougher in such matters. 
In this case, the client’s counsel was only given a warning and a 4,000 € 
fine in the disciplinary council of the Association.” 
“I don’t think there are ways to influence people who are suffering from 
mental disorders. Also they must have the right to bring their concerns for 
investigation. However, the actions of legal counsels can be influenced by 
prohibitions from appearing in court and by ordering punishment. It might 
be a good idea to consider a prohibition against appearing in court that 
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would encompass all courts. One solution could be that to qualify as a 
legal counsel, one must be a member of the Bar Association. Then, the 
control of their behaviour would be taken to the disciplinary council of the 
Association.” 
“Provide the necessary resources. Avoid signing all kinds of ‘human rights 
conventions’ that usually are just used as instruments by those who wish 
to exert improper influence at the court.” 
“Legislation should be introduced that would allow more effective 
interventions and that would protect the difficult position of the judges. An 
impartial judge cannot take counter-action himself and is therefore 
helpless.” 
Being prepared 
Take the matter seriously 
“It would be most important to take the matter seriously. There is no point 
in making a police report if the outcome is ‘well, a judge must be able to 
take some criticism’, or ‘this doesn’t quite sound like a real crime’, or 
‘there have always been crazy clients’.” 
Security plans/schemes, awareness, training 
“in our working community, as is customary nowadays, attention has been 
paid to updating security plans, and security issues have been discussed.” 
“it would be important to have the opportunity for work guidance, and 
clear instructions as to how to cope.” 
“it could make sense to ‘coach’ people with regard to potential situations 
(what kind of situations might occur), and provide possible action 
alternatives (what to do if…).” 
“in regards to possible situations, it would be a good idea to be prepared 
by discussing potential threats and identifying suitable measures.” 
“it would be good if the issue could at times be discussed at the workplace. 
It would also be good if corruption could be better recognised.” 
Personal and data protection 
The comments on this topic were only about personal data. Nobody mentioned 
the need for general personal protection. However, one judge felt that self-
defence devices would be welcomed. 
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Protect personal data 
“My address is protected/secret, my telephone number is secret, in front of 
the house there is no mailbox with a name. The entire staff should keep the 
judge’s contact information and whereabouts secret; the correct answer is 
that whoever is asking will be contacted. For instance a real bomber does 
not call in order to talk with the civil servant about something but just to 
find out where he is at the moment, in order to be able to detonate his 
bomb so that it hits the target. It is completely wrong to publish the names 
of the members of the court and even of the secretaries in the court docket; 
this has, however, to be done today since the legislator/employer does not 
understand the importance of protecting the sanctity of the home and other 
security of the staff… Criminals should be prohibited from hiding behind 
hoods and masks (in the courtroom), and media should not take 
photographs of the members of the court.” 
Self-defence 
“Judges should be allowed to carry a handgun if threats of violence exist. 
In the offices, pepper gas sprays should be easily available to judges.” 
Security technology and guards 
Metal detectors, security controls, security guards 
“The security arrangements of the general courts are insufficient. The 
Ministry is not allocating resources to this. Regrettably, they’ll only wake 
up after the first ‘victims’.” 
“The Government has not been concerned with the safety of our court but 
announces bluntly that there is no money for security checks or guards 
(which they can afford in their own Ministry). The security risks are real. 
It is possible to walk into the courtroom with a bomb or a machine gun in 
your briefcase (as was seen in Hamina in the ‘90s). We are unable to 
guarantee the safety of the persons involved although we force them to 
come to court.” 
“More attention should be paid to preventing problem situations. 
Nowadays outsiders are allowed to enter the courthouse and the office 
rooms almost without obstacles.” 
“There should be sufficient security (police or security guards) in the 
court’s sessions in case drunks or mentally troubled persons cause 
disturbances.” 
“Visitor monitoring should be introduced. Currently there is none.” 
“Access to courtrooms should perhaps be monitored better.” 
“Effective visitor monitoring is the best way to guarantee physical 
integrity for civil servants.” 
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“Security checks should be made to everybody who arrive at court 
sessions.” 
“Security control checks should be introduced in every district court.” 
“Metal detectors should be installed at the office entrances.” 
“Police monitored persons coming to the office, and made a house search 
to find possible firearms.” 
“Sufficient guard services.” 
Record telephone conversations 
“I have sometimes wished that telephone conversations could be 
recorded.” 
Design out risks 
“Clients should be received in a ‘closed’ setting so that it is not possible to 
go freely from the reception to the offices of the staff.” 
“The entrances to offices and courtrooms should be isolated from areas to 
which the public has access. Visitor monitoring should be organised so 
that clients are not allowed to meetings without the approval of the civil 
servant in question.” 
“Client reception should be located/placed immediately after the entrance 
of courthouses.  
Administrative court judges 
Administrative court judges had experienced a smaller volume of problems 
than the other two groups. In line with this, they did not have very many 
comments on this issue. What they suggested is more focused on awareness 
and training issues, while personal data protection and physical security 
measures were each mentioned only twice. 
Being prepared 
React promptly, report 
“Attempts should always be reported to the police.” 
“It is important to react to even minor attempts at influence, and to inform 
the superiors about the matter.” 
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Awareness raising, training 
“In order to prevent attempts at improper influence, it is important to 
enhance internal discussions about such problems in the office, and think 
about measures that individual employees can resort to.” 
“It would be important to try to anticipate all kinds of attempts at 
influence.” 
“Clear instructions should be given on how to record and report, and how 
to act overall, i.e. what one has to listen to as a civil servant” 
 “It could be a good idea to give instructions as to how to act in difficult 
situations.” 
“Staff should be instructed on how to act in such situations (e.g. how to 
secure evidence).” 
Personal and data protection 
Also in this respondent group, no need for general personal protection was 
mentioned. 
Protect personal data 
“I have had my telephone number made secret.” 
“I have asked for the protection of my contact information in the 
population register. 
Security technology and guards 
Metal detectors, security guards 
“in order to prevent violence risks, security guards should be employed, or 
the oral procedure must be transferred into premises where security 
arrangements have been taken care of.” 
“preventive security measures should be introduced also in administrative 
courts, not just general courts. It is better to act before anything happens.” 
Reorganise working routines (prevent unnecessary exposure) 
“To my mind, in an administrative court where the procedure is written, 
unnecessary telephone calls to the referendary and the judge could be 
restricted. If one wants to find out what is being done about the case, this 
information can be received from the registry. An extension of the 
deadline given for explanations could be done via the office secretary. To 
my mind, it is not necessary to connect the telephone call of someone 
dissatisfied with the decision.” 
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Sweden 
Prosecutors 
The Swedish prosecutors had a lot of suggestions, much more than their 
Finnish colleagues. The suggestions were quite uniform, perhaps indicating a 
higher general level of awareness in Sweden, and also implying that some of 
the shared ideas derive from a common source, or an ongoing debate:  
Influence the potential perpetrators: Education, reaction, powers, 
punishments 
Education by publicity 
“Severe punishments and much publicity to inform people of what you 
risk if you attack someone in their role of civil servant. Juveniles seem to 
be totally unaware of the seriousness of this.” 
“Imprisonment should be applied in order to demonstrate how seriously 
such behaviour is considered.” 
Tough on crime 
“Recently one of our prosecutors had been victimised in that someone shot 
at his apartment. This happened soon after a judgment against a Bandidos 
[motorcycle gang] supporter was announced. If immediately after the 
attack prosecutors and the police had conducted house searches at known 
Bandidos addresses (reasonable suspicion that they were behind it, even 
though the perpetrator was unknown) this surely would have had a 
preventive effect; but this ‘would have been too expensive’. This has been 
done in Denmark, as well as in Italy.” 
“Tougher punishments for threats against civil servants.” 
“Build prisons, tougher punishments, legal tools that give us better 
chances to combat crime.” 
“The ombudsman should be more restrictive regarding querulants.”  
Being prepared 
Take the matter seriously, threat analysis 
“Introduction of threat assessments in so-called high-risk cases” 
“In certain cases, extend threat analyses to comprise also prosecutors, not 
just parties and witnesses.” 
“Security in the district courts and in transports should be reviewed. 
Currently security is sub-standard.” 
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“An improved security approach by the authorities.” 
“Greater awareness is needed that the profession may involve certain 
risks, and there should be a clear focus on preventive work…” 
“Improve the security significantly and take actual threats seriously.” 
“In certain kinds of cases, it is important to think in terms of security 
already before something happens.” 
“Courts must be formed in a different way (more security thinking 
overall). There does not seem to be any mental preparedness among the 
court staff when prosecuted persons, witnesses and so on express violent 
or strong emotional reactions. Judges must also be required to lead and 
respond to incidents.” 
“Security work must be upgraded and fortified. All of this must even be 
allowed to cost money.” 
Awareness, training 
“[The authorities] have an incredibly sloppy attitude towards violence at 
work.” 
“The issue is under permanent discussion in workplace meetings, and we 
have both security plans and risk coping plans at the workplace. These 
plans are being discussed and revised on a permanent basis.” 
“Learn self-defence and a security-oriented approach.” 
“All employees should be better informed if somebody is victimised by 
violence/threats.” 
“If someone in the authority is victimised by threats, a risk assessment 
must be made immediately, with adequate protection. There should be 
information on the home page on how employees should act if we 
experience violence or threats, and on what kind of help is available for 
us.” 
“The central authority should support training regarding how the staff 
should respond in order to defuse an aggressive situation.” 
“Information and debriefing after incidents.” 
Personal and data protection 
Publicity strategy (to decrease exposure)  
“Specially appointed media spokespersons in high-publicity high-risk 
cases.” 
“Prosecutors are far too much represented as individuals… the media 
focus is on the person rather than the professional position. We should 
learn from media spokespersons as used by the police.” 
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“There should be a non-police/non-prosecutor as a media spokesperson so 
that police and prosecutors don’t need to make press statements…” 
Protect personal data, anonymise 
“It would be important to classify certain professional categories as 
confidential – groups that have a certain general threat profile, such as 
prosecutors, judges and police officers.” 
“Register data about us who are employed in the legal system should be 
made secret.” 
“Make secret all personal data for people employed in the justice sector, 
register vehicles to the authority rather than to the individual.” 
“Restrict access to information regarding civil servants in official registers 
etc.” 
“A legal way must be found to conceal my address and other personal 
data.” 
“The possibility of a secret address would be appreciated, and this already 
when one is appointed, not just after something has already happened.”  
“There should be the possibility of making it more difficult for the general 
public to get information about us prosecutors. This should be done as 
soon as we are employed.” 
“See to it that employees of the prosecutor authority cannot be traced in 
the internet.” 
“Important to make it more difficult to get personal data on prosecutors.” 
“Do not allow prosecutors to be identified over the Internet.” 
“Protected personal data for prosecutors.” 
“Personal data must be protected.” 
“Persons who want it should be allowed protected personal data.” 
“Protection of personal data is necessary.” 
“To be allowed better protection in terms of protected personal data.” 
“All prosecutors should automatically receive a protected address, 
telephone numbers and office telephones.” 
“Personal data must be protected immediately when one is employed.” 
“Our home addresses should be automatically made secret.” 
“Faster action in regards of better protected personal data such as 
telephone, car registration, real estate register data, etc. It must be made 
difficult to obtain such information about prosecutors.” 
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“Employer must have a dialogue with individual prosecutors and support 
the prosecutor by e.g. arranging for personal data protection that prevents 
finding such information on the prosecutor and his family.” 
“Employer should arrange for and pay for secret telephone numbers.” 
“Concerning the security of individual prosecutors, measures are needed 
that would prevent finding information about the family and address of the 
prosecutor. One should be allowed to be registered in a different address 
just because one is a prosecutor. Information on family relations should be 
deleted.” 
“Prosecutors should not appear by name but only as a “representative of 
the prosecution authority”. Two or more prosecutors can sign the 
prosecution request, as well as take the case to court.” 
“It is important to discuss the strategy concerning cases where harassment, 
threats etc. may come up. Perhaps several prosecutors could deal with the 
same case if it has a high-risk profile. It should be made clear that the 
prosecution and the decision are coming from the authorities and not from 
an individual prosecutor. Perhaps there should also be a press/media 
[service] responsible who would take care of external contacts and who 
would not give any names but would emphasise that it was the authority 
who is responsible for the decision. Why should the press have the name 
and face of the prosecutor?” 
“Is it really necessary that the prosecutor’s name appears in the 
summons?” 
“That prosecutors are always presented by name could contribute to a 
fixation on the prosecutor’s person.” 
“The prosecutor’s role should be anonymised in certain risk situations so 
that one prosecutor deals with arrest, one prepares the prosecution, one 
appears in court etc.” 
“Prosecutors should have their vehicles registered to the authority, not to 
their person. Also personal data should be protected.” 
“Protected ID.” 
“Currently our direct telephone numbers are published on our external 
homepages and in all correspondence to those who report crimes etc. 
Totally unacceptable.” 
“I wish that the employer more clearly works out good personal protection 
for us with anonymity.” 
“In Sweden, it is far too easy to track down prosecutors and police 
officers. Why should it be so easy to search official registers to find out 
where I live? It seems to be mostly criminals who have protected personal 
data… This must change – we are not living in the “folk’s home” any 
more! Naïve politicians and journalists who because of their own interests 
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wish to reinforce the current order are going to oppose such changes, with 
the consequence that new harassments and attacks are going to occur.” 
General personal protection 
“Generally improving the personal protection of prosecutors.” 
“Personal protection by the police should be improved.” 
“The need for personal protection must be taken more seriously. Improved 
protection of the facilities is not enough, a civil servant must feel that there 
is a certain level of protection provided by the State… a greater extent of 
preventive measures ought to be present in the security thinking of the 
authorities.” 
“Improved personal protection, personal alarm, take the problem 
seriously.” 
”General protection against attacks in the prosecutor’s private sphere.” 
“Persons in at-risk positions must be provided improved protection 
already before anything happens.” 
“It is essential that the security thinking is improved… this is more than 
just metal detectors and alarms. The focus must be on personal security.” 
“When a new high-risk case is initiated, the employer should be 
responsible for measures improving security… offering alarms, attack 
alarms, personal alarm equipment etc… Prosecutors working with cases 
that represent an increased security risk must be offered training, and even 
better, should have a security expert assess the prosecutor’s security at 
home, his family members, and the workplace.” 
Security technology, guards 
Improved security, metal detectors, security guards, police 
“…security in courtrooms should be improved significantly. It’s a joke 
that anybody can enter a courtroom armed to the teeth if they wish to do 
so.” 
“The most neglected area is the physical environment of the courtrooms. It 
is devastating that that there is no obligatory entrance control in the 
courtrooms.” 
“Security in courts must be improved. Today, there is no control of 
persons who hang around courthouses, except for high-risk cases. The 
situation could be easily improved by making everybody pass a metal 
detector. This would not have an impact on the transparency or the right to 
follow court proceedings.” 
“Alarm screens (metal detectors) must be installed in our courthouses.” 
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“Metal detectors and uniformed and armed security staff should be 
standard.” 
“Protection of the premises must be improved, in particular in the 
courtrooms. It is self-evident that courtrooms must have metal detectors 
and security staff with special training to prevent threats.” 
“Physical protection of courtrooms, metal detectors etc.” 
“Introduce obligatory security checks at courtrooms.” 
“Improve the security in courts by having guards and installing metal 
detectors at the entrances.” 
“Permanent entry controls with metal detectors in courtrooms for 
everybody.” 
“Better security controls in courtrooms but also in the prosecution 
authority. In courts, metal detectors should be installed.” 
“Metal detectors and security guards at the entrances to all courts in 
Sweden, where all visitors must pass.” 
“Metal detectors at the entrance of courtrooms.” 
“Metal detectors in all courtrooms.” 
“Metal detectors in the courts, and prohibition against wearing outdoor 
clothes and taking bags into the courtroom.” 
“Physical protection of courtrooms must be improved. Metal detectors 
must be made routine.” 
“Metal detectors in the courts and better security arrangements, more 
security guards in courts.” 
“Improved security in courtrooms, obligatory security guard and security 
control of the audience. 
“Improve cooperation with the local police.” 
Alarms, camera surveillance of homes 
“Perhaps camera surveillance could be introduced at the homes of 
prosecutors and judges for the time period when they are dealing with 
cases connected to motorcycle gangs. On a voluntary basis, of course.” 
“Alarm and monitoring measures to the home.” 
“It is important that we receive economic support regarding alarms when 
we are dealing with certain kinds of cases. There should be centralised 
money for this, not just something the local court should take care of.” 
 
76 
Trace telephone calls 
“Threats and implicit threats could have been prevented if the 
premises/facilities were better and the courthouses would be better 
protected. Telephone calls with implicit threats could be deterred by the 
possibility of recording the telephone calls.” 
Design out risks 
“There should be dedicated staff entrances that are not on the same side as 
the public entrances.” 
“Improve security in and around courtrooms. E.g. so that prosecutors are 
always able to exit somewhere other than where they entered, and that 
they can go somewhere between cases.” 
“We need improved protection of the workplaces but in particular the 
courts. In the office, there should be some kind of reception for visitors, 
including an alarm.” 
Reorganise working routines 
“Routines according to which there is more than one prosecutor in certain 
cases in order to ‘depersonalise’ the prosecutor.” 
“A clear division of labour should take place so that the prosecutor is 
changed in cases involving serious criminals. Also, in certain cases several 
prosecutors should be assigned to the case. This diminishes exposure of an 
individual prosecutor.” 
“Downplaying the individual prosecutor’s role in cases, and instead 
allocating a high-risk case to several prosecutors.” 
“Create an understanding among the prosecutors that certain risks are 
unavoidably connected with the prosecutor’s role, but to cooperate if a 
certain prosecutor wishes to avoid a certain crime investigation for a 
specific reason.” 
“An improved security approach… it is important that it is not always the 
same persons who confront the groups. There should be many 
investigators and many prosecutors in one single case.” 
“I would restrict the obligation of prosecutors to be always available to the 
general public.” 
“Telephone calls should not be connected directly to the prosecutor 
without a secretary acting as an in-between.” 
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Other 
Prosecutor behaviour 
“I think we need to discuss the prosecutor’s behaviour towards the 
suspect. I believe their behaviour has repercussions that are today 
underestimated.” 
“Avoid making statements that demonise or glorify certain criminal 
persons, organisations or groups since this triggers reactions and is 
counterproductive in regards to recruitment to and status of such groups.” 
General court judges 
Also this group had a lot to say, more than their Finnish colleagues, but less 
than the Swedish prosecutors. In this respondent group, there were, however, a 
couple of calming voices recommending that the system should not over-
respond: 
“One should be careful so as not to exaggerate the risks involved in 
working in the justice sector.” 
“I think these issues should not be exaggerated…” 
Education, reaction, powers, punishment 
Tougher punishments 
“these issues must be taken seriously. Society must give a sign that such 
things are not acceptable, i.e. tougher punishments and other measures 
must be introduced.” 
Legislation to stop going to court just for the sake of going to court 
One respondent suggested a legislative change to stop cases with unacceptable 
motives: 
“An amendment must be introduced to the law on criminal procedure – in 
tort cases - to the effect that persons are not allowed to sue when it can 
clearly be seen that their only objective is to harass the staff of the court.” 
Being prepared 
Take the matter seriously 
“The leaders and the workplace must take such issues seriously and 
provide adequate support to those victimised.” 
“The security approach in courts must be improved.” 
“Security should be prioritised…“ 
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Awareness-raising, training, workplace routines 
“Staff should be provided with annual information as to what measures are 
recommended if improper influence should occur.” 
“More information about the issue, and it is then important that time is 
allocated for the purpose, it feels like there is no time for security issues 
alongside of challenging everyday work.” 
“Training on how to deal with difficult and unpredictable persons.” 
“Clear and well-known routines regarding how improper influence should 
be dealt with at the workplace.” 
“It is extraordinarily important that those experiencing serious improper 
influence are protected by the employer, and in less serious cases receive 
support and the possibility of talking to people with some formal 
competence…” 
Personal and data protection 
Protect personal data 
“It should be self-evident that judges can have a protected address even if 
there is no immediate threat… I am not at all concerned about my own 
security, but threats against the family and relatives, great damage may be 
caused. Therefore, there should be central arrangements that our addresses 
are protected. The home telephone number has mostly already been 
secured.” 
“Judges and prosecutors should automatically be given protected personal 
data.” 
“Protected personal data” 
“De-identify, anonymise” 
“Improve the possibilities of keeping the telephone number and home 
address secret.” 
General personal protection 
A more specific protection approach is reflected in the following responses. 
These judges knew the situation of prosecutors and wanted that same approach 
adopted also for judges: 
“I would welcome it if the routines they have for prosecutors, with 
security officers for a given region, are adopted also for the courts.” 
“Adopt the prosecutors’ personal ‘security package’ in courts.” 
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Security technology, guards 
Access control, metal detectors, security guards… 
“Anybody with weapons can enter the courtroom as there are no metal 
detectors. There are no guards in the entrance hall where the general 
public is waiting. However, police-organised security controls related to 
threats are working without problems.” 
“We have no guards or other protection in and outside the courtroom. One 
can easily bring in weapons and other things except when there is security 
control.” 
“In courts where it is considered to be necessary, general entry control 
should be allowed in order to improve the security of those who visit the 
court.” 
“Metal detectors and security guards could be good.” 
“General security control at courtroom entrances must be introduced 
immediately.” 
“Introduce metal detectors in district courts! Obviously, there must also be 
staff that intervenes if the alarm goes off. As it is today, anybody can enter 
with whatever weapon: bombs, knives, firearms without anybody noticing 
it before it is too late!” 
“See to it that security guards and police are quickly available if 
something should happen.” 
“In our case, there is not even a security guard… Guards should be 
assigned to all courts, together with the introduction of metal detectors.” 
“Introduce general security controls in all courts.” 
“Closer cooperation with the police in cases where threats etc. can occur.” 
Alarms 
“In our district court, we have changed and improved security, i.a. by 
introducing direct alarm connections to the police. If security should still 
be increased, this would require that a security guard was always present” 
Design out risks 
“The workplace should be in a special courthouse, with special rooms and 
escape routes from courtrooms that are designed for security…” 
“When the new district court building was constructed, the staff was all the 
time involved… Thus, there is always an escape route for the court 
members from all courtrooms…” 
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Reorganise working routines 
“Allocate decision-making among several persons.” 
Other: transparency 
One judge was concerned about “friendship corruption”: 
“…concerning friendship corruption in office appointments. Create better 
transparency, and [information on] the merits of the applicant must be 
made available to other applicants.” 
Administrative court judges 
Swedish administrative court judges reported fewer problems than did 
prosecutors or general court judges. Accordingly, they had a smaller number of 
suggestions as to what could be done to respond to improper influence. The 
scale of ideas is nevertheless rather extensive, ranging from data protection to 
physical security devices and security guards, and awareness-raising and 
training. Overall, many of the ideas are not – and cannot be - completely novel, 
but if systematic work on improving is undertaken, the replies provide several 
valid points. 
Education, reaction, powers, punishment 
Tough on crime 
The oftentimes popular idea for preventing problems, tougher criminalisation 
regarding irregularities, was actually suggested by only one administrative 
court judge: 
“if something is to be done, then the limits of penalisation should be 
extended.” 
Being prepared 
Awareness-raising, training 
Three judges thought of awareness-raising issues and the need for training: 
“There is a defect in risk awareness.” 
“…it is important to continuously follow and discuss security issues” 
“The workplace should carry out internal training and discussions on 
security issues on a regular basis” 
“…create awareness of the problem, training courses on how I should 
understand what is improper influence, and what I should do”. 
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Related to this idea were some comments of a more general nature, suggesting 
that the central authority should be more aware of and more active in regards of 
security issues: 
“The central authority should have a more active security policy and a unit 
for this that is also consulted at the everyday level”  
“it is remarkable that the Court Authority does not carry out a security or 
threat analysis when court buildings are being constructed or renovated” 
“facilities are sub-standard from the security perspective and nobody 
seems to take any responsibility” 
Personal and data protection 
Personal data protection 
Two judges were concerned about personal data protection: 
“…one can in any case have a secret telephone number” 
“the judgment should not reveal who has been the judge in a case”. 
Security technology and guards 
Access control  
“Improved monitoring of the facilities protection in courts so that 
outsiders and visitors are not allowed just anywhere. Better visitor control, 
don’t leave visitors alone when they are reading the original judgment and 
other documents. Better control of people who come to the court facilities 
for various tasks. Better control of people who deliver coffee etc. to the 
courts. It would be best if nobody was allowed to get beyond the 
reception. If they are allowed further, they must be accompanied by 
somebody. All visitors should be given a name badge, like in private 
enterprises, Parliament, or the Ministry.” 
One judge had a very specific suggestion, also on improved controls, not of the 
courtroom but of hospital facilities: 
“better control and tougher rules in hospitals… so that the inmates cannot 
get weapons and drugs there.” 
Technical devices, metal detectors 
Quite a few administrative court judges had thought about metal detectors and 
other protective devices, improved design of the facilities, or improved visitor 
routines: 
“…nobody should be allowed into the court facilities or the courtroom 
without having passed a security control. The security control should 
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comprise a metal detector as they have in airports, or what they have in the 
Council buildings in Brussels.” 
“obligatory entrance controls should be a routine” 
“metal detectors at entrances” 
“metal detectors for oral hearings” 
“Make everybody who come into courtrooms be subjected to the same 
controls that they have at airports, metal detectors etc.” 
Record telephone calls, camera surveillance (securing evidence) 
One judge had a specific useful measure in mind, considering the difficulties in 
securing evidence of improper influence: 
“it would be useful if telephone conversations could be recorded so there 
would be documentation of verbal threats”. 
Similarly, another judge proposed video surveillance:  
“legislation should allow camera surveillance of courtrooms”. 
Security guards 
Two judges were of the opinion that more permanent security guards are 
needed: 
“Security guards” 
“More permanent security guards” 
Design out risks 
Design out risks 
There were targeted suggestions as to technical and design aspects: 
“Investments in courtrooms: barriers between court members and the 
remaining part of the courtroom.” 
“When designing court facilities, changing all court buildings so that there 
are no breakable windows in the lower floors.” 
“There should be spaces to separate the parties involved outside the 
courtroom and perhaps also in the courtrooms.” 
One respondent presented the idea of another kind of opportunity reduction: 
“parking prohibitions at all courthouses (to avoid car bombs)” 
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Reorganise working routines 
Finally, one judge had an idea of a concrete improvement of working routines 
that could alleviate the burden caused by difficult clients: 
“the chief should take telephone calls and visits of persons who are 
suspected or known to victimise court staff… this is because the chiefs are 
the most experienced people in the court” 
Other 
Mostly, the suggestions were related to physical safety risks. However, one 
judge addressed the corruption issue, suggesting that it would be a good idea 
“[to] pay better salaries to judges in order to eliminate corruption risks.” 
84 
ANNEX 4. Heterogeneity and/or cumulation of risks of 
improper influence against prosecutors and judges. 
by Kauko Aromaa 
 
1. Victimisation risks are not random 
Surveys on violent victimisation in the general population have found that the 
phenomenon is relatively rare. For example, a large majority (83 %) of the 
respondents in the Finnish 1970 survey (Aromaa 1971) did not have a single 
experience of the different types of violence described in the questionnaire 
over the preceding two years (the first column in Table 3). It could be assumed 
that the result it statistically speaking generated through a stochastic process, in 
which the likelihood of any of the described violent incidents is the same for all 
respondents. If this assumption is correct, the distribution of the number of 
incidents experienced by each respondent should follow a simple Poisson 
distribution.  
This risk may, however, be different for different individuals – and maybe at 
different times and in different places. Thus, the alternative assumption would 
be that the interviewed sample consists of groups – or individuals – with 
broadly different violence risks. Intuitively, the latter assumption would seem 
to be closer to real life – indeed, it is very plausible to assume many social 
distributions to be of the latter kind rather than of the first kind. 
If the latter assumption is correct, the distribution of violent victimisation 
incidents experienced by the survey respondents should approach a 
transformation of the Poisson distribution which is based on an assumption of 
heterogeneous, not homogeneous violence risks. Robert Fisher (1941) named 
this transformation the negative binomial distribution. The distribution is 
defined by two parameters, the first one (α) representing the average initial risk 
of a certain event occurring; while the second parameter (β) represents the risk 
of the same occurring once more. (The simple Poisson distribution is defined 
by one parameter only, namely α which is equivalent to the arithmetic mean μ 
of the distribution). 
James S. Coleman (1964, 300) says that he was initially unaware of Fischer's 
work and of some of his followers,
16
 as he re-invented this distribution in the 
1960s, naming it "the contagious Poisson distribution". The term "contagious" 
referred to the idea that a first victimisation – a first occurrence of the given 
kind of incident – moves the person into a new category of persons with a 
different, more intensive, risk as compared with the average population. An 
interpretation would be that the risk was "contaminating" the respondents who 
would then eventually become more prone to further victimisations. 
                                                 
16
 e.g. Feller 1943, 1968, 1971. 
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Alternatively, this could happen if the initial victimisation is understood as an 
indication of an above-average risk to begin with. The difference is important 
in theoretical terms: the question is about whether risks are just heterogeneous 
or (also) cumulative, as implied by Coleman’s “contagion”. Contagion means 
that the victimisation event itself may change an individual’s risk.  
When studying this problem, Coleman refers to the famous first application of 
the Poisson distribution by Bortkevitch (1898):
17
 The number of deaths 
resulting from being kicked by a horse was recorded for 10 corps in the 
Prussian army over a period of 20 years. This provides 200 cases or 
observations, where the observation unit is one corps over a period of one year. 
The average number of deaths per corps-year was 0.61, and the distribution of 
deaths is shown in Table 1. The observed distribution is strikingly similar to 
the theoretical one. 
Table 16. Deaths from the kick of a horse in the Prussian army 
(i) N(i) (n(i), calculated)
Number of deaths Number of corps Calculated number of 
with (i) deaths corps with (i) deaths
per year per year (α = μ= .61)
0 109 108.7
1 65 66.3
2 22 20.2
3 3 4.1
4 1 0.6
200 199.9  
 
In this situation, it also seems to be plausible to accept the idea that the 
distribution of the number of deaths across units would be random, i.e. the risk 
at that level could be assumed to be homogeneous. A different situation might, 
however, also be possible if different corps would have dissimilar discipline, 
routines and skills concerning the handling of horses. 
On the other hand, Coleman also presents an example where the "contagious" 
distribution has a close resemblance to the distribution of work accidents that 
occurred in an American industrial plant, previously also shown for example 
by Greenwood & Yule (1920). Coleman's example is from Hill & Trist 1953: 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17
 as cited in Coleman 1964, 291. 
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Table 17. Number of men with given numbers of accidents in an industrial 
plant 
Number of Number of men Poisson Poisson with
accidents with (i) accidents α = .429 contagion, α = .372
β = .285
(i) n(i) n(i) n(i)
0 200 188.2 199
1 64 80.7 64.9
2 17 17.4 18.7
3 6 2.5 5.1
4 2 0.3 1.4  
 
In Coleman’s interpretation, “… if these accidents were random among men 
(that is if no one were accident-prone, or one accident did not lead to another), 
then the assumption of the Poisson would be fulfilled … But … more men 
have several accidents (three or four) than the Poisson model predicts. This 
suggests that the contagious model might be appropriate, even though it is 
fairly clear that here there is more heterogeneity (accident-proneness) than 
contagion (one accident leading to another) … whatever the interpretation of b, 
the model does fit rather well. The size of α, .372, is a measure of the general 
accident rate for those who have had no accidents, while the size of β, .285, 
indicates that those who have had one accident have a rate for the second 
which is .285 higher than those who have had none, or about .657.” (Coleman 
1964, 304-305). 
These examples indicate that it could make sense to analyse how the incidence 
of victimisation to violence varies in victimisation survey data. The example 
below is taken from the first Finnish national violence victimisation survey 
(Aromaa 1971). In this survey, the number of victimisation incidents was 
approximated by using the number of different levels or degrees of violence as 
reported by the respondent. This variable is not perfect; however, controls from 
later data
18
 could show that this crude variable has a very high correlation with 
a question that is directly about the number of violent incidents. 
As shown in Table 3, the distribution of the number of victimisation incidents 
is clearly dissimilar to the theoretical simple Poisson distribution. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18
 Aromaa 1974. See Sirén (1976) for a sophisticated discussion of the complex statistical 
issues involved. 
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Table 18. The number of victimisations to violent incidents over the preceding 
two years (24 months) as reported in the interviews, compared to 
corresponding simple Poisson and negative binomial distributions in the 1970 
data (Aromaa 1971, 10). 
Number of Number of Corresponding Correspoding
incidents*) respondents Poisson distribution (1) negative binomial
α = μ =.241 distribution (2)
α = .155, β = .825
0 829 765.4 834.1
1 100 184.5 88.0
2 25 22.2 29.4
3 7 1.8 12.0
4 7 0.1 5.4
5 1 0.01 2.5
6 4 0.00 1.2
7 1 0.00 0.6
Total 974 974 973.2  
*) estimated from the number of different levels of violence in the reply of the 
respondent 
For distributions (1) and (2):   χ2 = 12.58<12.6 =χ2 (.95), df = 6 
Also in other empirical studies,
19
 the theoretical simple Poisson distribution 
and empirical distributions have not resembled each other very closely. This 
observation has been given two main explanations or interpretations. In the 
following, these are called the heterogeneity hypothesis and the accumulation 
hypothesis concerning the event intensity. 
Everyday experience would support the idea that the victimisation risk is 
usually not homogeneously distributed in the general population. The 
interpretation problem, and the particular significance of this observation is not 
just this but the fact that the same distribution may also be generated by the 
accumulation or reinforcement tendency of the risk. 
From the perspective of preventing victimisation, both interpretations have 
relevance:  
1) a broad range of the risk means that some prevention measures should be di-
rected at groups with an exceptionally high risk, and empirical studies may be 
applied to specify what kinds of groups these are. 
2) the accumulation tendency of the risk means that it is worthwhile to try to 
specify groups where this tendency is strong because interventions directed at 
such groups may have a particularly good cost-benefit ratio. 
                                                 
19
 e.g. Aromaa 1974, Sparks 1976, Spilerman 1970, Wolf 1972. 
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Thus, for instance in the case of a person who has been victimised very often in 
his/her job, it is perhaps more worthwhile to focus the analysis on his/her 
working conditions rather than on his/her personality; however, it could also 
make sense to train him/her to act adequately in such work-related problem 
situations, and to teach him/her to recognise such problem situations and to 
neutralise them.  
Correspondingly, in the case of a woman who is repeatedly victimised by 
partner violence, perhaps one should look for remedies to the situation rather 
than the behaviour of the victim or the partner, albeit that also these issues may 
be relevant. If a partner relationship cannot be fixed, one must look for ways of 
terminating it and neutralising the risk. This does not exclude approaches that 
attempt mediation or personal therapy, which must also be possible. 
For other kinds of risks, other remedies may be relevant. For instance, the 
snatching of handbags in a street environment will decrease if the volume of 
suitable targets is reduced (the potential victims start avoiding known or likely 
hot spots, and/or keep their property in a way which prevents a simple 
snatching). Such risks may be reduced by studying the likely environments and 
targeting personal and CCTV surveillance of these places; potential/known 
offenders are profiled and their surveillance is improved by, for instance, 
distributing their pictures and personal data among the security staff, etc. 
Interventions targeted at young women or other groups with specific risk 
patterns are different from interventions addressing certain kinds of lifestyles 
or living conditions, and both kinds of interventions are worth planning and 
carrying out. The task is analogous with the one of alcohol control policy: 
interventions may address the entire population or specific population 
categories. This is not a question of mutually exclusive alternatives, and 
instead both approaches have their justification. Price policy, restrictions of 
availability, and education both at general and group-specific levels, as well as 
support provided for problem consumers are acceptable interventions, each one 
of which has a particular way of working. 
2. What may explain the non-random nature of risks 
After the 1970 study, some later analysis was carried out in order to see how 
much of the heterogeneity/accumulation property of the incidence distribution 
could be made to disappear, by controlling for a few background characteristics 
obviously related to the risk (age, gender, urban-rural area of residence, 
education). The victimisation rate varied considerably according to gender and 
age. Similarly, some specific professions could be found for which 
victimisation and its repetitive character were particularly high, such as nurses 
and restaurant doormen. Respondents in these jobs explained that violent and 
threatening situations occurred practically every day or every week, which 
means that it happened very frequently, considering that the vast majority of 
the population had no such experiences and that most of those who did had 
experienced only one such event. If the observed distribution would primarily 
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depend on risk heterogeneity deriving from such circumstantial factors, 
controlling for these could be expected to decrease the resemblance of the 
distribution of victimisation incidents with the theoretical negative binomial 
distribution. 
The small sample was not really sufficient for a detailed analysis of this kind. 
However, it was quite clear that rough controls of the respondent's age and 
gender did indeed have some of the expected consequences, the observed 
original distribution thus being to a great degree explained by risk 
heterogeneity. 
In a later survey (Aromaa 1974), the joint effects of age, gender and alcohol 
habits on the heterogeneity/accumulation of victimisation risks were controlled 
for. The dataset was a bit larger, and the incidence of victimisation was 
estimated by a direct question taking the form "how often did this happen?" 
The result was interesting because the heterogeneity / accumulation tendency 
did not disappear after these operations. Heterogeneity / accumulation was 
strongest among young men with a high level of alcohol consumption – the 
same group who also had the highest victimisation rate.  
Overall, frequent alcohol consumption increased the victimisation rate for 
young men as well as for adult men and adult women. For young women, the 
result was different: also for them, frequent alcohol consumption clearly 
increased the victimisation rate, but weakened the accumulation / heterogeneity 
tendency of their victimisation distribution.  
Could this mean that women who were frequent alcohol users did not live in 
circumstances that created risk accumulation – or that this is true for women 
consuming alcohol only infrequently, since violence in their case might often 
be partner or workplace violence? This hypothesis is inspired by a later study, 
according to which those two violence types are more common among women 
in general, while the violence experienced by women who are frequent alcohol 
consumers would more often be alcohol-related incidents that resemble similar 
male experiences (case descriptions indicate that this may be the case). Further 
analysis would be better facilitated if the data would be able to single out 
different subcategories of violence, such as, for example, partner violence, or 
drinking-related violence, since the character of risks is likely to be different 
across such subcategories. 
3. Consequences of non-randomness of risk 
Tim Hope and Alan Trickett (2004) have pondered on such observations. 
Trying to interpret the different hypotheses behind the negative binomial 
distribution, they comment that the victimisation risk in a given population 
cross-section - such as typically applied in our usual victimisation surveys – is 
known to vary over a broad range, but that also the risk of specific persons may 
change considerably from one point in time to another.  
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They suggest for instance that over time, a specific person may develop 
"immunity" in relation to a certain type of risk. For example, domestic burglary 
may after the initial victimisation event indicate that this particular housing 
unit has an above-average victimisation risk which will be expressed in new 
burglaries in the future. However, as a consequence of a burglary, a housing 
unit may be equipped so well as to render future burglary almost impossible. 
Consequently, the improved protection triggered by the initial burglary may 
transform the target to near immunity. 
Also victims of crimes against persons may follow similar developmental 
paths. A person assaulted on the street may change his/her routine activity 
patterns in one way or another. He/she may, for example, acquire a weapon and 
start practising combat skills, and begin actively looking for similar situations 
that provide opportunities for revenge. He/she may also continue as before, 
continuing to lead a risk-prone, assault-inducing way of life despite the 
occasional victimisations. However, he/she may also change his/her behaviour 
patterns so that he/she in the future carefully avoids risk situations, risky 
drunkenness, and protects him/herself by moving in dangerous areas only as a 
member of a group, never alone. 
Continuing this line of thought, it should become obvious that a cross-section 
of the general population in fact comprises many kinds of individuals of whom 
everybody is in a specific stage of his/her victimisation career. Victim careers 
may be of many kinds, and putting effort in studying such careers is likely to 
produce significant new information that is valuable for preventive purposes. 
If the victimisation event changes the victim's behaviour, then over time 
individuals and groups are going to emerge who have learned to minimise or to 
avoid risk - for them, victimisation may cause a decrease of risk in the future. 
At the same time, new generations have grown in new risk circumstances to 
gain increased and improved/accumulating experiences of these risks, and have 
over time gradually begun to change their behaviour accordingly. Some 
individuals also alter their behaviour patterns rapidly, while others do it more 
slowly or not at all. Furthermore, for example work-related risks may change if 
one shifts to another job, as in the case of the security guard, waitress or nurse 
who, because of repeated victimisation (or for other reasons) eventually 
changes jobs or even the employment sector, as a consequence of which his/her 
risk may change radically. Similarly, the risk of partner violence may suddenly 
change as the life situation changes, such as when a violent partner relationship 
is terminated - or initiated. The risk of a person with multiple violence 
experiences may change as a consequence of him/her stopping drinking, or 
after a change in the circles with whom he/she spends his/her time. There are 
many such processes that influence the outcome. If such processes are better 
recognised, it is also easier to acquire new information that is valuable in 
regards to preventing or minimising risks. One person may presently be at the 
beginning of this career, another may be struggling with attempts of gaining 
control over his/her situation, somebody else may have reached relative 
immunity. 
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Cross-sectional data require this kind of complementary information because 
they are able to grasp the time dimension only to a rather limited extent. It is, 
however, true that also cross-sectional data may be improved so that they 
would also comprise questions of the respondent's recent history, his/her victim 
career, and related changes in his/her own behaviour patterns and his/her life 
circumstances. Just by way of example, in the case of work-related violence, 
important additional information could concern a change of job, a change of 
working tasks, or attaining training and education in person-to-person combat 
skills or interaction skills. Similarly, in the case of partner violence, the 
important additional information could concern a radical move such as leaving 
the relationship (breaking up), or participation in mediation, therapy etc.  
4. Promising possibilities 
Distribution analysis of survey data in this framework may provide interesting 
new hypotheses and also suggest new possible answers to risk-related issues, 
whether concerning scientific explanations or practical prevention. Admittedly, 
the weaknesses and shortcomings of the available empirical data cause 
uncertainties: it may for instance happen that a result indicating risk 
heterogeneity may also - at least in part - be due to respondent characteristics 
that cause variation as to how well he/she remembers different kinds of events, 
and how willing he/she is to tell about such events. Similar matters may even 
explain why some persons report a large number of victimisation events while 
other may not disclose a single one. Ostensive heterogeneity may also be 
caused by the fact that the victimisation experiences of some people are of a 
shameful nature or otherwise they prefer to keep these secret, while some other 
persons may have experiences that are thought to even bring honour to the 
victim. This kind of difference may exist for instance between partner violence 
experiences by women and peer violence of young men. 
The analysis of distributions renders new possibilities for the analysis of many 
issues related to risk, and for defining new hypotheses. Distributions do not 
prove anything but they may open our eyes to otherwise ignored perspectives. 
The data of surveys are often under-utilised. This approach may improve the 
situation also in this respect. 
5. The negative binomial distribution and the incidence of harassment and 
threats among judges and prosecutors in Sweden and Finland 
From earlier survey results on repeat victimisation, it could be anticipated that 
also victimisation in this study is not a fully random phenomenon. This can be 
analysed by studying incidence distributions (cf. Aromaa 1971). 
The exercise is about fitting the negative binomial distribution to the incidence 
distribution of improper influence. Below, only the incidence distributions for 
harassment and threats are analysed.  
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Since only a few judges and prosecutors reported having been victims of 
damage to property, violence, or corruption attempts, incidence distributions of 
these forms of influence cannot be meaningfully compared. 
Harassment 
In the Swedish data, it was common to report only one incident of harassment 
(33 % of all victims). More than two-thirds (71 %) of those victimised had 
experienced three incidents or fewer. There are, however, a small number of 
persons who had reported being victims of a very large number of harassment 
incidents, ranging from about ten incidents up to an estimated 40 incidents. 
(Table 19). 
Table 19. Harassment: how many times in the preceding 18 months, Finland 
and Sweden 
Finland 0 1 2 3 4 5+ Total victims α β
N 555 45 43 13 5 13 674 119
% 82 7 6 2 1 2 100 18 .20 2.0
N 198 18 23 6 4 7 255 57
% 78 7 9 2 2 3 100 22 .25 2.6
N 220 13 18 7 - 6 264 44
% 83 5 7 3 - 2 100 17 .19 3.0
administrative N 137 14 2 - 1 - 154 17
court judges % 89 9 1 - 1 - 100 11 .11 0.2
Sweden
N 921 59 40 24 11 38 1093 172
% 84 5 4 2 1 3 100 16 .17 2.7
N 415 35 29 17 9 23 528 113
% 79 7 5 3 2 4 100 21 .23 2.4
N 347 18 7 3 2 10 387 40
% 90 5 2 1 1 3 100 10 .11 1.6
N 159 6 4 4 - 5 178 19
% 89 3 2 2 - 3 100 11 .11 3.0
general court judges
general court judges
administrative court 
judges
Total
prosecutors
Total
prosecutors
 
In the Finnish data, the pattern is similar, with the largest number of incidents 
amounting to 99. This means that harassment victimisation is a markedly 
cumulative/heterogeneous phenomenon (cf. Aromaa 1971; Hope & Trickett 
2004). 
Of the Swedish general court judges who had been harassed, almost one-half 
(45 %) reported only one incident, which is more than any of the other Swedish 
professional groups. This indicates that the cumulation and/or heterogeneity of 
risks is significantly less for judges – a plausible finding considering the 
previous statements regarding the position of judges in the law enforcement 
continuum. 
In the Finnish replies, a similar overall pattern was found. In both countries, the 
problem level was lowest in the administrative courts, where also the frequency 
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distribution of problem events resembled a random risk distribution more than 
in the other respondent groups. 
This pattern suggests that part of the heterogeneity/accumulation tendencies 
found in the total distributions can be traced back to the heterogeneity caused 
by the different working environments and exposure: the victimisation 
incidences in some respondent subcategories are closer to a random pattern 
than they were in the total data. 
In the Finnish replies, a similar overall pattern was found. In both countries, the 
problem level was lowest in the administrative courts, where also the frequency 
distribution of problem events resembled a random risk distribution more than 
in the other respondent groups. 
Threats 
Overall, threats were less prevalent than harassment experiences, and this is 
also reflected in the form of the incidence distributions given in Table 16. 
The cumulativity / heterogeneity of the sub-distributions lessens in some 
instances. This is likely due to the fact that when breaking down the 
populations by type of job, we have effectively controlled for part of the 
sources of the heterogeneity / cumulation tendencies. 
Table 20. Threats – how many times in the preceding 18 months, Finland and 
Sweden  
Finland 0 1 2 3 4 5+ Total victims α β
N 632 25 13 1 2 1 673 42
% 94 4 2 0 0 0 100 6 .06 1.1
N 232 14 8 - 2 - 255 24
 % 91 5 3 - 1 - 100 9 .09 1.1
N 251 7 4 1 - 1 264 13
% 95 3 2 0 - 0 100 5 .05 1.0
administrative N 149 4 1 - - - 154 5
court judges % 97 3 1 - - - 100 3 .03 0.0
Sweden
N 1026 37 18 7 1 4 1093 67
% 94 3 2 1 0 0 100 6 .07 1.8
N 486 21 13 4 1 3 528 42
% 92 4 2 1 0 1 100 8 .09 1.7
N 375 8 2 1 - 1 387 12
% 97 2 1 0 - 0 100 3 .03 0.8
N 165 8 3 2 - - 178 13
% 93 4 2 1 - - 100 7 .07 1.1
administrative court 
judges
Total
prosecutors
general court judges
Total
prosecutors
general court judges
 
Indeed, the remaining non-random variations would more likely be based on 
differences in how the respondents tend to interpret potential problem 
situations, and how sensitive they are to such issues. Another remaining source 
of heterogeneous / cumulative risk could be the person’s own behaviour and 
his/her person in terms of provocation and risk avoidance, but also the 
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variations in cases that they deal with, i.e. extra-personal issues. None of these 
aspects could be assessed in the current study. 
Discussing such distributions, Wittebrood and Nieuwbeerta (2000) conclude 
that “individuals who have once been victims suffer a substantial higher risk of 
subsequent victimisation. This effect of previous victimisation can partly be 
explained by a real effect of previous victimisation (state dependence), but 
more largely by the effects of patterns of routine activities (heterogeneity in the 
population)”. 
In the Finnish replies, a similar overall pattern was found. In both countries, the 
problem level was lowest in the administrative courts, where also the frequency 
distribution of problem events resembled a random risk distribution more than 
in the other respondent groups. 
This consistent pattern for both countries points to the obvious conclusion that 
a large proportion of the heterogeneity / accumulation tendencies found in the 
overall distributions can be traced back to the heterogeneity caused by the 
different working environments and exposure: the victimisation incidences in 
each respondent subcategory are much closer to a random pattern than they 
were in the total material. 
Conclusion 
The incidence distributions of both harassment and threat victimisation 
correspond to the idea of risks being non-random, heterogeneous and/or 
cumulative. Such heterogeneity / cumulativity could be hypothesised to result 
from different tasks and working environments of prosecutors, and judges. 
Controlling for the job title of the respondents was done in an attempt to see 
whether the non-randomness of the distributions could be traced back to simple 
differences in the work of prosecutors and judges. The attempt was not very 
successful: only the incidence distribution for Finnish administrative court 
judges turned out to correspond to the random risk hypothesis. This indicates 
that the risk of improper influence depends on significant characteristics other 
than the professional role of the respondent. Future research could examine this 
matter more in depth, since a large number of possible features with an 
influence on the nature of the risk might be in operation. 
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Annex 5. The introductory letter (Sweden) 
A survey on harassment, threats, violence and other improper influence 
attempts at judges and prosecutors 
In an earlier study carried out by the Swedish National Council for Crime 
Prevention (Brå), harassment, threats, violence, and other attempts at improper 
influence at authority representatives in the criminal justice system were found 
to be a relatively serious problem. 
In cooperation with the Finnish research institute HEUNI, Brå is now carrying 
out a comparative study of attempts to irregularly influence judges and 
prosecutors in Finland and Sweden. Has the situation changed since the earlier 
study?  
Attempts to influence the functions of the authority 
At the end of this letter, there is a link to a survey about harassment, threats, 
violence and corruption of particular kinds. The particular kinds refer to the 
circumstance that the purpose of the behaviour is to influence the functions of 
the authority, comprising both not taking action as well as improper action. To 
capture all these kinds of behaviour, we use the collective term “attempts at 
improper influence”.  
Definition of different forms of improper influence: 
Harassment: Slander, molestation and subtle threats that are not illegal threats 
or other ways of exerting pressure that are not covered by criminal law. 
Threats: Illegal threats and similar criminalised acts such as extortion. 
Violence: Assault and other similar criminalised acts. 
Vandalism: Arson, damage to property and similar criminalised acts. 
Corruption: Promise or offer of a bribe or other benefit for carrying out one’s 
functions as an authority (bribery). 
Behind the attempts at improper influence, there may be perpetrators who are 
perceived as both having the motivation and the ability to make the things 
happen that they promise. Even if the acts may seemingly be less serious or 
take extremely subtle forms, they may be perceived as being very serious 
because of the objectives believed to be behind them. Some acts are not even 
criminalised, such as certain kinds of harassment, but they can nonetheless 
have a very negative impact on the person who is targeted. 
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Your participation is important 
You are one of the 1,800 persons who are given the opportunity to participate 
in the Swedish part of the study. In order for the study to be valid, it is 
important that the response rate is high. The results are going to be published in 
a Brå report already before the end of 2008.  
The replies are analysed with full confidentiality 
The survey replies are fully anonymous. Your reply cannot be linked to your e-
mail address. All results are going to be presented in an aggregated form, 
which means that individual respondents cannot be identified. We will be 
pleased to answer any questions you have concerning the survey. We are 
grateful for your help with the study! 
The link to the survey: 
http://www.webropol.com/P.aspx?id=215931&cid=43683270 
 
Lars Korsell, Jur. dr, Project leader        Johanna Skinnari, deputy project leader 
lars.korsell@bra.se         johanna.skinnari@bra.se 
08-401 87 11         08-401 87 14 
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Annex 6. The questionnaire
20
 
A survey of harassment, threats, violence and other attempts at improper 
influence against judges and prosecutors 
1) You work as* 
- A prosecutor in the Prosecution Authority 
- A prosecutor in the Economic Crime Authority 
- A permanent judge in a general court 
- A non-permanent judge in a general court 
- A permanent judge in an administrative court 
- A non-permanent judge in an administrative court 
2) Sex* 
- Female 
- Male 
3) Age*  
- 29 years or younger 
- 30¬–39 years 
- 40–49 years 
- 50–59 years 
- 60 years or older 
4) What is the geographic region where you work?* 
-  Large city and its environs 
-  Middle-sized city and its environs 
-  Smaller city and its environs 
_______________________________________________________________ 
5) Have you personally over the last eighteen months been victimised by 
harassment where you perceive that the objective was to influence your 
functioning as the representative of an authority (either in that particular 
situation or in the future)?  
- yes 
- no 
                                                 
20
 The original questionnaires were in Finnish and Swedish. This is a working translation by 
Kauko Aromaa. 
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6) How many times have you personally been subjected to harassment 
over the last eighteen months where you perceive that the objective was to 
influence your functioning as the representative of an authority? 
….. number of times 
_______________________________________________________________ 
7) What types of harassment have you been subjected to? If you have been 
a victim of several incidents, please select the one that was most 
disturbing.  
-  Disturbing telephone calls, letters, e-mails or SMS to the workplace 
-  Disturbing telephone calls, letters, e-mails, or SMS to your home 
(or privately) 
-  Reports to the ombudsman, complaints, crime reports or similar  
-  Signs of yourself or your family being observed 
-  Stalking (disturbing observation, somebody “happens” to come or 
appear close to you or your family)  
-  other, please specify ……………………………….. 
_______________________________________________________________ 
8) At what stage of the criminal procedure were you subjected to the 
harassment? If you have been victimised several times, please choose the 
event that you think was most serious. 
- before a case was opened in an administrative court 
- before a police investigation of a crime was initiated 
- in connection with an arrest 
- in connection with a remand decision 
- at some other stage of the police investigation 
- in connection with a remand procedure 
- in connection with the decision on prosecution 
- in connection with the exchange of documents with the appeal 
court 
- in connection with the main court proceedings in a general court or 
in oral procedure in an appeal court 
- while waiting for a court decision 
- in connection with appeal to a higher court  
- after the court verdict has become binding 
_______________________________________________________________ 
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9) Who do you think was behind the harassment? Please check the 
alternative you think is most relevant.  
-  Substance abuser 
-  Mentally disturbed person 
-  Person in a desperate situation 
-  Querulant 
-  Individual offender without links to criminal networks/groups 
-  Political activist (right-wing, left-wing, environment, animal rights) 
-  Member of a youth gang 
-  Member of a prison gang 
-  Member of a biker gang 
-  Member of an East European criminal gang 
-  Person from another organised crime context 
-  Business/entrepreneur 
-  Unknown 
_______________________________________________________________ 
10) Did you tell anyone about the most serious case of harassment? Please 
select the relevant alternative.  
-  Colleague 
-  Your superior 
-  Security officer/security chief 
-  Staff officer, union representative or similar 
-  Family 
-  Friend 
-  Police (report) 
-  Other, please specify …………………………………… 
_______________________________________________________________ 
11) Have you personally over the last eighteen months been subjected to 
threats where you perceive that the objective was to influence your 
functioning in your role as an authority (in that situation or in the future)?  
-   yes 
-   no 
_______________________________________________________________ 
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12) How many times have you personally over the last eighteen months 
been subjected to threats where you perceive that the objective was to 
influence your function as an authority? 
….. number of incidents 
_______________________________________________________________ 
13) What kind of threat have you been subjected to? If you have been 
subjected to several incidents, please select the one that was most 
disturbing. 
-  A threat made by telephone calls, letters, e-mails or SMS to the 
workplace 
-  A threat made by telephone calls, letters, e-mails or SMS to your 
home (private) 
-  A threat made personally in connection with a confrontation (such 
as a court negotiation) 
-  A threat made by tips or other indirect hints 
-  Other, please specify ……………………………………… 
_______________________________________________________________ 
14) At what stage of the procedure were you being threatened? If you have 
been threatened several times, please select the incident you think was the 
most serious.  
- before a case was opened in an administrative court 
- before a police investigation of a crime was initiated 
- in connection with an arrest 
- in connection with a remand decision 
- at some other stage of the police investigation 
- in connection with a remand procedure 
- in connection with the decision on prosecution 
- in connection with the exchange of documents with the appeal 
court 
- in connection with the main court proceedings in a general court or 
in oral procedure in an appeal court 
- while waiting for a court decision 
- in connection with appeal to a higher court  
- after the court verdict has become binding 
_______________________________________________________________ 
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15) Who do you think was threatening you? Please select the alternative 
that is most relevant.  
-  Substance abuser 
-  Mentally disturbed person 
-  Person in a desperate situation 
-  Querulant 
-  Individual offender without links to criminal networks/groups 
-  Political activist (right-wing, left-wing, environment, animal rights) 
-  Member of a youth gang 
-  Member of a prison gang 
-  Member of a biker gang 
-  Member of an East European criminal gang 
-  Person from another organised crime context 
-  Business/entrepreneur 
-  Unknown 
_______________________________________________________________ 
16) Did you tell anybody about the most serious threat incident? Please 
select the right alternative.  
-  Colleague 
-  Your superior 
-  Security responsible/ security chief 
-  Staff responsible, union representative or similar 
-  Family 
-  Friend 
-  Police (report) 
-  Other, please specify …………………………………… 
_______________________________________________________________ 
17) Have you personally over the last eighteen months been subjected to 
violence where you perceive that the objective was to influence your 
functions as the representative of an authority (in that situation or in the 
future)?  
- yes 
- no 
_______________________________________________________________ 
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18) How many times have you personally over the last eighteen months 
been subjected to violence where the objective according to your 
perception was to influence your functions as the representative of an 
authority? 
….. number of times 
_______________________________________________________________ 
19) Were you given treatment because of a violence incident?  If you have 
been subjected to violence several times, please select the violence incident 
that you perceive as being the most unpleasant. 
-  No, no treatment was necessary 
-  Yes, I was given treatment in a hospital and also had to stay there 
for a while 
-  Yes, I was given treatment by a doctor/dentist, and could return 
home immediately 
_______________________________________________________________ 
20) At what stage in the criminal procedure were you subjected to 
violence? If you have been subjected to violence several times, please select 
the event that you perceive was the most serious. 
- before a case was opened in an administrative court 
- before a police investigation of a crime was initiated 
- in connection with an arrest 
- in connection with a remand decision 
- at some other stage of the police investigation 
- in connection with a remand procedure 
- in connection with the decision on prosecution 
- in connection with the exchange of documents with the appeal 
court 
- in connection with the main court proceedings in a general court or 
in oral procedure in an appeal court 
- while waiting for a court decision 
- in connection with appeal to a higher court  
- after the court verdict has become binding 
_______________________________________________________________ 
21) Who do you perceive was responsible for the violence? Please select the 
alternative that is most relevant.  
- Substance abuser 
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-  Mentally disturbed person 
-  Person in a desperate situation 
-  Querulant 
-  Individual offender without links to criminal networks/groups 
-  Political activist (right-wing, left-wing, environment, animal rights) 
-  Member of a youth gang 
-  Member of a prison gang 
-  Member of a biker gang 
-  Member of an East European criminal gang 
-  Person from another organised crime context 
-  Business/entrepreneur 
-  Unknown 
_______________________________________________________________ 
22) Did you tell somebody about the most serious case of violence? Please 
select all relevant alternatives.  
-  Colleague 
-  Your superior 
-  Security responsible/security chief 
-  Staff responsible, union representative or similar 
-  Family 
-  Friend 
-  Police (report) 
-  Other, please specify …………………………………… 
_______________________________________________________________ 
23) Have you personally over the last eighteen months been victimised by 
damage to property/vandalism where you believe the purpose was to 
influence your work as the representative of an authority (in the current 
situation or in the future)?  
- yes 
-   no 
_______________________________________________________________ 
24) How many times have you personally over the last eighteen months 
been victimised by damage to property/vandalism where you believe the 
objective was influence your work as the representative of an authority? 
….. number of times 
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25) What kind of damage to property have you been victimised by? If you 
have been victimised more often than once, please answer regarding the 
most unpleasant incident 
-  Damage to authority premises or property 
-  Damage to private property 
-  Damage to somebody else’s property 
_______________________________________________________________ 
26) What was damaged? 
…………………………………… 
_______________________________________________________________ 
27) At what stage of the process were you victimised by damage to 
property? If you have been victimised more than once, please refer to the 
situation you felt to be the most serious one. 
- before a case was opened in an administrative court 
- before a police investigation of a crime was initiated 
- in connection with an arrest 
- in connection with a remand decision 
- at some other stage of the police investigation 
- in connection with a remand procedure 
- in connection with the decision on prosecution 
- in connection with the exchange of documents with the appeal 
court 
- in connection with the main court proceedings in a general court or 
in oral procedure in an appeal court 
- while waiting for a court decision 
- in connection with appeal to a higher court  
- after the court verdict has become binding 
_______________________________________________________________ 
28) According to your knowledge, who was the perpetrator of the damage 
to property? Please select the most relevant alternative.  
- Substance abuser 
-  Mentally disturbed person 
-  Person in a desperate situation 
-  Querulant 
-  Individual offender without links to criminal networks/groups 
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-  Political activist (right-wing, left-wing, environment, animal rights) 
-  Member of a youth gang 
-  Member of a prison gang 
-  Member of a biker gang 
-  Member of an East European criminal gang 
-  Person from another organised crime context 
-  Business/entrepreneur 
-  Unknown 
_______________________________________________________________ 
29) Did you tell somebody about the most serious incident of damage to 
property? Please select the relevant alternatives. 
-  Colleague 
-  Your superior 
-  Security responsible/security chief 
-  Staff responsible, union representative or similar 
-  Family 
-  Friend 
-  Police (report) 
-  Other, please specify …………………………… 
_______________________________________________________________ 
30) Have you personally over the last eighteen months been victimised by 
corruption where you believe the purpose was to influence your work as 
the representative of an authority (in the current situation or in the 
future)?  
- yes 
-   no 
_______________________________________________________________ 
31) How many times have you personally over the last eighteen months 
been victimised by corruption where you believe the objective was 
influence your work as the representative of an authority? 
….. number of times 
_______________________________________________________________ 
32) What kind of unlawful offer have you received? If you have received 
more than one offer, please select the one you felt to be most problematic. 
-  Offered a meal 
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-  Offered an object  
-  Offered a ticket to an event or travel 
-  Offered money 
-  Offered service 
-  Offered the opportunity to buy something at a very good price 
-  Other, please specify ………………………….. 
_______________________________________________________________ 
33) At what stage of the process were you victimised by an unlawful offer 
or other attempt at corruption? If you have been victimised more than 
once, please refer to the situation you felt to be the most serious one. 
- before a case was opened in an administrative court 
- before a police investigation of a crime was initiated 
- in connection with an arrest 
- in connection with a remand decision 
- at some other stage of the police investigation 
- in connection with a remand procedure 
- in connection with the decision on prosecution 
- in connection with the exchange of documents with the appeal 
court 
- in connection with the main court proceedings in a general court or 
in oral procedure in an appeal court 
- while waiting for a court decision 
- in connection with appeal to a higher court  
- after the court verdict has become binding 
_______________________________________________________________ 
34) Who do you perceive was responsible for the unlawful 
offer/corruption? Select the alternative that is most relevant.  
- Substance abuser 
-  Mentally disturbed person 
-  Person in a desperate situation 
-  Querulant 
-  Individual offender without links to criminal networks/groups 
-  Political activist (right-wing, left-wing, environment, animal rights) 
-  Member of a youth gang 
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-  Member of a prison gang 
-  Member of a biker gang 
-  Member of an East European criminal gang 
-  Person from another organised crime context 
-  Business/entrepreneur 
-  Unknown 
-  Other, please specify ………………………… 
_______________________________________________________________ 
35) Did you tell somebody about the most serious incident regarding 
unlawful offers/corruption attempts? Please select the relevant 
alternatives.  
-  Colleague 
-  Your superior 
-  Security officer/chief 
-  Staff responsible, union representative or similar 
-  Family 
-  Friend 
-  Police (report) 
-  Other, please specify ……………………………. 
_______________________________________________________________ 
36) Has your local workplace in some way changed its routines after a 
staff member (or his/her family member) was victimised by an attempt at 
improper influence?* 
-  No 
- Yes, physical protection and design of facilities 
- Yes, communication and self-protection 
- Yes, improved visitor routines 
- Yes, routines for reporting of incidents 
- Yes, improved external cooperation (e.g. with police) 
- Yes, improved internal dialogue (open communication about 
problems) 
- Other, please describe …………………………….. 
_______________________________________________________________ 
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37) Has your central authority in some way changed their guidelines after 
a staff member (or his/her family member) was victimised by an attempt 
at improper influence?* 
-  No 
- Yes, developed security strategy/security plan of the authority 
- Yes, new guidelines for physical protection and design of facilities 
- Yes, guidelines/routines for reporting of incidents 
- Yes, developed external cooperation (with e.g. other justice 
authorities) 
- Yes, improved internal dialogue (open communication about 
problems) 
- Other, please describe …………………………… 
_______________________________________________________________ 
38) Have members of your family or your friends over the last eighteen 
months been victimised by any of the attempts at improper influence listed 
below where you believe the purpose was to influence your work as the 
representative of an authority (in the current situation or in the future)?* 
- Harassment 
- Threat 
- Violence 
- Damage to property 
- Corruption 
- Not victimised 
_______________________________________________________________ 
39) How many times have your family members or friends been victimised 
over the last eighteen months by harassment where you believe the 
purpose was to influence your work as the representative of an authority? 
….. number of times 
_______________________________________________________________ 
40) How many times have your family members or friends been victimised 
over the last eighteen months by threats where you believe the purpose 
was to influence your work as the representative of an authority? 
….. number of times 
_______________________________________________________________ 
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41) How many times have your family members or friends been victimised 
over the last eighteen months by violence where you believe the purpose 
was to influence your work as the representative of an authority? 
….. number of times 
_______________________________________________________________ 
42) How many times have your family members or friends been victimised 
over the last eighteen months by damage to property where you believe 
the purpose was to influence your work as the representative of an 
authority? 
….. number of times 
_______________________________________________________________ 
43) How many times have your family members or friends been victimised 
over the last eighteen months by corruption where you believe the purpose 
was to influence your work as the representative of an authority? 
….. number of times 
_______________________________________________________________ 
44) How many times have you (or a family member) received psycho-
social support after having been victimised by improper influence? 
….. number of times 
_______________________________________________________________ 
45) What form of psycho-social support have you (or a family member) 
received after having been victimised by improper influence? 
- Support from a family member or a friend 
- Support from a colleague 
- Support from your superior 
- Support from the authority’s debriefing-service 
- Support from a therapist (psychotherapist, psychologist, 
psychiatrist etc.) 
- Other, please specify………………….. 
_______________________________________________________________ 
46) Please describe below your experiences of attempts at improper 
influence and/or about what could be done to prevent attempts at 
improper influence (what you, your workplace, the central authority, or 
the government could do). 
…………………………… 
 
Thank you for your cooperation! 
